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“NATURAL”  FOOD  LABELING:  FALSE  
ADVERTISING  AND  THE  FIRST  AMENDMENT  
  Caroline  Q.Shepard*  
Currently,   the   Food   and   Drug   Administration   has   not   stated   a  
regulated   definition   for   the   term   “natural,”   thus   resulting   in  
intentional  misuse  of  the  term  by  companies.    It  is  the  author’s  position  
that   the   most   equitable   outcome   for   regulation   and   limitation   of   the  
term   natural   would   be   achieved   by   applying   the   four-­‐‑prong   test   set  
forth   in   Central   Hudson   Gas   &   Electric   Corp.   v.   Pub.   Serv.  
Comm’n   of   New   York.      This   ensures   advancement   in   the  
marketplace   for   healthy   foods   to   help   increase   in   the   health   of  United  
States  citizens.  Further,  more  accurate  conclusions  are  reached  through  
regulation  that  considers  the  unique  circumstances  of  each  company’s  
usage  of  the  term  as  proposed  by  the  test.  
The  Central   Hudson   test   proposes   that   the   government   has   a  
substantial   interest   in   limiting  commercial   speech   if   the   following  are  
true:   (1)   the   commerical   statement   is   not   misleading,   (2)   the  
government   has   a   substantial   interest   in   regulation   of   the   commerial  
statement,   (3)   it   is   possible   for   the   regulation   to   advance   from   the  
government’s   interest,   and   (4)   the   resulting   regulation   will   not   be  
more   extensive   than   necessary   to   serve   the   purpose.      In   the   current  
context,  this  would  allow  the  government  to  insist  that  the  usage  of  the  
term  natural  be  limited  to  products  deserving  of  the  title  by  requiring  
companies   to   disclose   information   about   the   meaning   of   the   term   on  
their  packaging  or  by  prompting  the  Food  and  Drug  Administration  to  
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reevaluate   and   redefine   the   term   to   reduce   deceiving   or   misleading  
claims.  
Among  other  cases,  an  application  of  the  Ninth  Circuit’s  holding  
in   Ass’n   of   Nat’l   Advertisers   v.   Lungren,   the   Sixth   Circuit’s  
holding   in   Int’l   Dairy   Foods   Ass’n   v.   Boggs,   and   the   Northern  
District  of  California’s  holding  in  Kane  v.  Chobani,  Inc.  illustrate  the  
effectiveness  of  this  test.    These  cases  each  involve  the  usage  of  the  term  
natural   or   similar   marketing   buzzwords   to   advertise   products.    
Considering   that   the   context   of   companies’   misusage   of   the   term  
natural   falls   within   the   zone   of   interests   protected   by   the   Central  
Hudson   test,   the   government   is   granted   the   ability   to   suspend  
companies’   First   Amendment   rights   to   further   their   interest   in  
advancing  the  marketplace  of  healthy  foods  and  increasing  the  health  of  
United  States  citizens.     Thus,  case   law   leads   to  a  strong  presumption  
that  it  would  be  beneficial  for  Congress  to  codify  the  Central  Hudson  
test,   which   would   essentially   require   the   Food   and   Drug  
Administration   to   redefine   and   regulate   usage   of   the   term   natural  
mandating  that  companies  present  their  products  in  such  a  way  that  is  
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In  The  Omnivore’s  Dilemma,  Michael  Pollan  argues  that,  
Like  the  hunter-­‐‑gatherer  picking  a  novel  mushroom  off  
the   forest   floor   and   consulting   his   sense   memory   to  
determine   its   edibility,  we  pick  up   the  package   in   the  
supermarket  and,  no  longer  so  confident  of  our  senses,  
scrutinize   the   label,   scratching   our   heads   over   the  
meaning   of   phrases   like   “heart   healthy,”   “no   trans  
fats,”   “cage-­‐‑free,”   or   “range-­‐‑fed.”      What   is   “natural  
grill  flavor”  or  TBHQ  or  xanthan  gum?    What  is  all  this  
stuff,   anyway,   and   where   in   the   world   did   it   come  
from?1  
In   his   eye-­‐‑opening   explanation   of   the   food   Americans   eat  
today,   Pollan   explains,   “[T]he   pleasures   of   eating   industrially,  
which   is   to   say   eating   in   ignorance,   are   fleeting.     Many  people  
today   seem  perfectly   content   eating   at   the   end  of   an   industrial  
food  chain,  without  a  thought  in  the  world.”2  
The   price   of   continuing   this   way   of   thinking   appears   a  
bargain  but  fails  to  account  for  its  true  cost  “charging  it  instead  
to  nature,  to  the  public  health  and  purse,  and  to  the  future.”3    To  
shift   this  paradigm,   there  must  be  a   release  of   information—an  
explanation   and   education   of   what   exactly   goes   into   food  
products—so  as   to  enhance   the  markets   for   truly  healthy   foods  
 
   1.     MICHAEL  POLLAN,  THE  OMNIVORE’S  DILEMMA,  5  (Penguin  Books,  1st  ed.  
2006).  
   2.     Id.  at  11.  
   3.     Id.  at  410.  
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and  increase  the  overall  health  of  Americans.    While  the  change  
is  a  bold  move,  which  will  ultimately  require  restrictions  on  food  
companies’  commercial  speech,  it  is  a  necessary  change  that  will  
protect   the   fundamental   right   we   have,   as   humans,   to   choose  
what  we  eat.  
The   term   “natural”   is   one   of   the   most   widely  
misunderstood  terms  advertised  on  companies’  food  packages.4    
To  regulate  companies’  use  of  the  term  natural,  Congress  should  
codify  an  exception  for  commercial  speech  regulation  under  the  
First   Amendment   as   set   forth   in  Central   Hudson   Gas   &   Electric  
Corp.   v.   Pub.   Serv.  Comm’n   of  New  York.5      Following   the  Central  
Hudson  four-­‐‑prong  test,  Congress  can  restrict  companies’  use  of  
the   term   as:   (1)   prior   case   law   has   shown   that   this   type   of  
commercial   speech   is   not   misleading;   (2)   Congress   has   a  
substantial   interest   in   regulating   the   speech;   (3)   the   regulation  
advances  directly  from  Congress’s  interest;  and  (4)  the  proposed  
regulation   is   not   more   extensive   than   necessary   to   serve   the  
interest.6  
This   paper   focuses   entirely   on   the   use   of   the   term   natural  
when   advertising   food   products.   In   doing   so,   this   paper   will  
discuss   how   companies   use   the   freedom   allocated   by   the   First  
Amendment   to   advertise   and   market   their   products   using   the  
loosely  defined  and  regulated  term  to  promote  sales  despite  the  
fact   that   the   majority   of   a   product’s   ingredients   may   not   be  
derived   from   natural   ingredients   or   created   using   natural  
processes.   This   paper   asserts   that   Congress   should   codify   the  
four-­‐‑prong  Central  Hudson   test   thereby   requiring   the   Food   and  
 
   4.     Urvashi  Rangan,  TEDxManhattan:  From  Fables  to  Labels,  TED,  (Feb.  6,  2012),  
http://tedxtalks.ted.com/video/TEDxManhattan-­‐‑Urvashi-­‐‑Rangan-­‐‑Fr.    
   5.     Cent.  Hudson  Gas  &  Elec.  Corp.  v.  Pub.  Serv.  Comm'ʹn  of  N.Y.,  447  U.S.  
557,  566  (1980).    The  U.S.  Supreme  Court  decided  whether  the  New  York  Public  
Service  Commission  violated  the  electrical  utilities’  First  Amendment  rights  when  it  
banned  promotional  advertising  of  electricity  usage  ultimately  finding  the  ban  
unconstitutional.    Id.  at  571-­‐‑72.  
   6.     Id.  at  566;  Jonathan  S.  Kahan  &  Jeffrey  K.  Shapiro,  The  First  Amendment  and  
the  Food  and  Drug  Administration'ʹs  Regulation  of  Labeling  and  Advertising:  Three  
Proposed  Reforms,  58  FOOD  &  DRUG  L.J.  353,  354  (2003)  (discussing  the  appropriate  
application  of  Central  Hudson’s  four-­‐‑prong  test  to  the  FDA’s  regulatory  
requirements).  
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Drug  Administration   (FDA)   to  redefine  and  regulate  use  of   the  
term  natural  as  Congress  has  a  substantial  interest  in  advancing  
the   marketplace   for   healthy   food   and   the   health   of   all  
Americans.  
I.  FOOD  LABELING  HISTORY  
The  Wiley   Act,   passed   in   1906,   “was   considered   a   substantial  
reform   [in   food   labeling]  because   it  prohibited   the  adulteration  
and   misbranding   of   food   sold   and   distributed   in   interstate  
commerce.”7    However,  while  the  Wiley  Act  drastically  changed  
the  industry’s  labeling  schemes,  it  only  offered  modest  reforms:  
the   government  was   enabled   to   go   to   court   but   no   affirmative  
requirements  for  compliance  were  set.8    The  FDA’s  predecessor,  
the   Bureau   of   Chemistry,   “proposed   a   ‘false   and   misleading’  
provision   that   would   hold   industry   accountable   for   its  
statements  about   the  “disease   fighting”  properties  of  a  product  
(known  as  ‘disease  claims’),  which  Congress  adopted  in  1912.”9  
Recognizing   the   public’s   continued   concern   for   unsafe  
foods,  drugs,  and  marketing  schemes,  in  1938,  Congress  enacted  
the  Federal  Food,  Drug,  and  Cosmetic  Act  (FDCA)  to  replace  the  
Wiley  Act.10     The  FDCA  enabled   the  FDA   to  “promulgate   food  
definitions   and   standards   of   food   quality   [as   well   as]   set  
tolerance   levels   for   poisonous   substances   in   food   [and   could]  
take   enforcement   action   on   adulterated   and   misbranded  
foods.”11    The  FDCA  required  that  specific  nutrition  information  
 
   7.     Holk  v.  Snapple  Beverage  Corp.,  575  F.3d  329,  331  (3d  Cir.  2009).    See  
MELVIN  J.  HINICH  &  RICHARD  STAELIN,  CONSUMER  PROTECTION  LEGISLATION  AND  
THE  U.S.  FOOD  INDUSTRY,  6  (Pergamon  Press,  ed.  1980)  (stating  ,“The  act  established  
the  Food  and  Drug  Administration  (FDA)  and  is  often  called  the  Wiley  act  after  Dr.  
H.  Wiley,  a  leading  champion  of  pure  and  safe  foods  in  the  ‘progressive  era.’”).  
   8.     Holk,  575  F.3d  at  331.  
   9.     Claudia  L.  Andre,  What'ʹs  in  That  Guacamole?  How  Bates  and  the  Power  of  
Preemption  Will  Affect  Litigation  Against  the  Food  Industry,  15  GEO.  MASON  L.  REV.  
227,  229-­‐‑30  (2007)  (citing  MARION  NESTLE,  FOOD  POLITICS:  HOW  THE  FOOD  INDUSTRY  
INFLUENCES  NUTRITION  AND  HEALTH,  233  (2002)).    
   10.     Federal  Food,  Drug,  and  Cosmetic  Act  of  1938,  Pub.  L.  No.  75-­‐‑717,  52  Stat.  
1040  (1938);  Holk,  575  F.3d  at  331  (citing  United  States  v.  Bhutani,  266  F.3d  661  (7th  
Cir.  2001)).  
   11.     Holk,  575  F.3d  at  331  (quoting  Fellner  v.  Tri-­‐‑Union  Seafoods,  L.L.C.,  539  
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be   placed   on   the   informational   panel   or   the   principal   display  
panel   (PDP).12      Seemingly   a   step   in   the   correct   direction,   the  
FDCA   had   its   shortcomings:   neither   the   FDA   nor   the   FDCA  
regulations  required  all   food   labels  provide  detailed  nutritional  
information.13    In  fact,  the  FDCA  only  required  nutrition  labeling  
when   there  was  a  nutrition  claim  by   the  manufacturer,   such  as  
low-­‐‑fat  or  high  in  fiber.14  
Following   the   passage   of   the   FDCA,   consumer   groups  
continued   to   express   concerns   about   unsubstantiated   health  
claims   on   food   and   beverages,   which   prompted   Congress   and  
the  FDA  to  consider  a  national  labeling  law.15    In  1966,  Congress  
passed   the   Fair   Packaging   and   Labeling   Act   (FPLA),   which  
regulated   food   products   under   FDA   jurisdiction.16      However,  
under  this  Act  companies  were  still  not  required  to  receive  FDA  
approval   for   product   labels   advertising   food   products   sold   to  
consumers.17  
Over   fifty   years   after   the   passage   of   the   FDCA   and   the  
FPLA,   Congress   passed   the   Nutrition   Labeling   and   Education  
Act   (NLEA).18      The  NLEA   introduced   a   number   of   substantial  
reforms.      First,   coverage   of   nutrition   labeling  was   expanded   to  
encompass  all  products  under   the  FDA’s  authority.     Next,  both  
the   substance   and   form   of   ingredient   labels   were   changed.    
Third,  limitations  imposed  by  the  NLEA  were  enacted  regarding  
health   claims  and   finally,   the  definitions  of   all   nutrient   content  
 
F.3d  237,  251  (3d  Cir.2008)).  
   12.     PATRICIA  CURTIS,  FOOD  LABELING,  GUIDE  TO  FOOD  LAWS  AND  
REGULATIONS  86  (1st  ed.  2005).  
   13.     Holk,  575  F.3d  at  331.    
   14.     Id.  at  331-­‐‑32.  
   15.     Id.  at  332  (citing  Andre,  supra  note  9,  at  232).  
   16.     Curtis,  supra  note  12,  at  86;  15  U.S.C.  §  1451  (2012).  
   17.     Curtis,  supra  note  12,  at  85.    
   18.     Nutrition  Labeling  and  Education  Act  of  1990,  Pub.  L.  No.  101-­‐‑535,  104  
Stat.  2353  (1990)  (codified  at  21  U.S.C.  §  343(q)  &  (r)  et  seq.  (2014)).  The  regulations  
assisting  the  NLEA  are  located  in  21  C.F.R.  §  101.9  (2014);  Curtis,  supra  note  12,  at  85  
(stating,  “All  new  regulations  are  published  in  the  Federal  Register  prior  to  their  
effective  date  and  compiled  annually  in  Title  21  of  the  Code  of  Federal  Regulations.  
Summaries  of  new  regulations  (proposed  regulations  and  final  regulations)  are  
posted  on  the  FDA’s  Internet  website”).  
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claims  and  serving  sizes  were  standardized.19    Today,  the  NELA  
ensures  that  nutrition  labeling  is  displayed  on  all  packaged  food  
products   allowing   companies   to  make   credible   advertising  and  
marketing   claims,   and   to   educate   a   consumer   on   how   a   food  
product   fits   into   his   or   her   diet.20      Failure   to   comply   with   the  
NELA   standards,   ultimately   results   in   the   misbranding   of   a  
particular  food  product.21  
II.  THE  FDA’S  CURRENT  DEFINITION  OF  NATURAL  
Previous   case   law   asserts   that   it   is   not   a   violation   of   the   First  
Amendment   for   food   companies   to   use   the   term  natural  when  
advertising  their  products,  as  no  set  definition  exists  regulating  
the   term.22      For   example,   the  Northern  District   of  California   in  
Astiana   v.   Hain   Celestial   Grp.,   Inc.   determined   that   without   a  
definitive   FDA   definition   for   the   term   natural,   the   court   was  
unable   to   evaluate   whether   use   of   the   term   was   false   or  
misleading.23      Similarly,   the   Northern   District   of   California   in  
Janney   v.  Gen.  Mills   confirmed   that   the   court   could   not   rule   on  
the  issue,  as  it  required  review  of  the  FDA’s  nonexistent  formal  
definition  or  regulations  for  the  term  natural.24  
While   the   USDA   and   FDA   have   created   minimum  
standards  for  companies  purporting  to  sell  organic  food,  they  do  
not   currently   regulate   companies’   use   of   the   term   natural.25    
Rather,  the  USDA’s  current  policy  statement  of  natural  is:  
[M]eat,  poultry,  and  egg  products   labeled  as  “natural”  
must   be  minimally  processed   and   contain  no   artificial  
 
   19.     Holk,  575  F.3d  at  332;  The  Impact  of  the  Nutrition  Labeling  and  Education  Act  of  
1990  on  the  Food  Industry,  47  ADMIN.  L.  REV.  605,  606  (1995).  
   20.     See  Curtis,  supra  note  12,  at  96.    
   21.     Id.  
   22.     See  Astiana  v.  Hain  Celestial  Grp.,  Inc.,  905  F.  Supp.  2d  1013,  1016  (N.D.  
Cal.  2012).  
   23.     Id.  at  1016.  
   24.     Janney  v.  Mills,  944  F.  Supp.  2d  806,  812,  814  (N.D.  Cal.  2013).  
   25.     Nat’l  Organic  Program,  U.S.D.A.  AGRIC.  MKTG.  SERV.,  
http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/ams.fetchTemplateData.do?template=Templat
eC&leftNav=NationalOrganicProgram&page=NOPConsumers&description=Consu
mers  (last  modified  Oct.  17,  2012).  
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ingredients.      However,   the   natural   label   does   not  
include   any   standards   regarding   farm   practices   and  
only   applies   to   processing   of  meat   and   egg   products.    
There   are   no   standards   or   regulations   for   the   labeling  
of  natural  food  products  if  they  do  not  contain  meat  or  
eggs.26  
Similarly,   the   FDA   claims   that   its   current  policy   statement  
of  natural  is,  
From  a  food  science  perspective,  it  is  difficult  to  define  
a   food   product   that   is   “natural”   because   the   food   has  
probably  been  processed  and   is  no   longer   the  product  
of  the  earth.    That  said,  [the]  FDA  has  not  developed  a  
definition  for  use  of  the  term  natural  or  its  derivatives.  
However,  the  agency  has  not  objected  to  the  use  of  the  
term  if  the  food  does  not  contain  added  color,  artificial  
flavors,  or  synthetic  substances.27  
The  FDA’s  definition  of  added  color/color  additive  is:  
[A]ny   material,   not   exempted   under   section   201(t)   of  
the  act,  that  is  a  dye,  pigment,  or  other  substance  made  
by   a   process   of   synthesis   or   similar   artifice,   or  
extracted,   isolated,   or   otherwise   derived,   with   or  
without  intermediate  or  final  change  of  identity,  from  a  
vegetable,   animal,   mineral,   or   other   source   and   that,  
when  added  or  applied  to  a  food,  drug,  or  cosmetic,  or  
to   the   human   body   or   any   part   thereof,   is   capable  
(alone   or   through   reaction  with   another   substance)   of  
imparting  a  color  thereto.28  
The  FDA’s  definition  of  “artificial  flavoring”  is:  
[A]ny   substance,   the   function   of   which   is   to   impart  
flavor,  which   is  not  derived  from  a  spice,   fruit  or   fruit  
 
   26.     Id.  
   27.     What  is  the  Meaning  of  ‘Natural’  on  the  Label  of  Food?  U.S.    FOOD  AND  DRUG  
ADMIN.,  http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/ucm214868.htm  (last  
updated  Apr.  10,  2014).  
   28.     21  C.F.R.  §  70.3  (2014).  
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juice,   vegetable   or   vegetable   juice,   edible   yeast,   herb,  
bark,   bud,   root,   leaf   or   similar   plant   material,   meat,  
fish,   poultry,   eggs,   dairy   products,   or   fermentation  
products   thereof.      Artificial   flavor   includes   the  
substances   listed   in   §§   172.515(b)   and   182.60   of   this  
chapter   except   where   these   are   derived   from   natural  
sources.29  
Further,   natural   is   not   defined   in   the   FDCA,   and   despite  
“repeated   requests,   the   FDA   has   expressly   declined   to   define  
‘natural’   in   any   regulation   or   formal   policy   statement.”30      In  
1991,   a   year   following   the   passage   of   the   NLEA,   “the   FDA  
solicited  comments  on  a  potential  rule  adopting  a  definition  for  
the  term  ‘natural,’  noting  that  the  use  of  ‘natural’  on  food  labels  
‘is   of   considerable   interest   to   consumers   and   industry.’”31    
During   that   time,   the   FDA’s   informal   policy   statement   of   the  
term   natural   meant   “nothing   artificial   or   synthetic   (including  
colors  regardless  of  source)  is  included  in,  or  has  been  added  to,  
the  product  that  would  not  normally  be  expected  to  be  there.”32  
 
   29.     21  C.F.R.  §  101.22  (2014).    The  FDA  recognizes  the  following  as  safe  
synthetic  flavorings:    
Synthetic  flavoring  substances  and  adjuvants  that  are  generally  recognized  
as  safe  for  their  intended  use,  within  the  meaning  of  section  409  of  the  Act,  
are   as   follows:   Acetaldehyde   (ethanal),   Acetoin   (acetyl   methylcarbinol),  
Anethole   (parapropenyl   anisole),   Benzaldehyde   (benzoic   aldehyde),   N–
Butyric   acid   (butanoic   acid),   d-­‐‑   or   l-­‐‑Carvone   (carvol),   Cinnamaldehyde  
(cinnamic   aldehyde),   Citral   (2,6–dimethyloctadien–2,6–al–8,   geranial,  
neral),   Decanal   (N-­‐‑decylaldehyde,   capraldehyde,   capric   aldehyde,  
caprinaldehyde,  aldehyde  C–10),  Ethyl  acetate,  Ethyl  butyrate,  3–Methyl–
3–phenyl   glycidic   acid   ethyl   ester   (ethyl-­‐‑methyl-­‐‑phenyl-­‐‑glycidate,   so-­‐‑
called  strawberry  aldehyde,  C–16  aldehyde),  Ethyl  vanillin,  Geraniol  (3,7–
dimethyl–2,6   and   3,6–octadien–1–ol),   Geranyl   acetate   (geraniol   acetate),  
Limonene   (d-­‐‑,   l-­‐‑,  and  dl-­‐‑),  Linalool   (linalol,  3,7–dimethyl–1,6–octadien–3–
ol),   Linalyl   acetate   (bergamol),   Methyl   anthranilate   (methyl–2–
aminobenzoate),   Piperonal   (3,4–methylenedioxy–benzaldehyde,  
heliotropin),  Vanillin.      
      21  C.F.R.  §  182.60  (2014).  
   30.     Janney  v.  Mills,  944  F.  Supp.  2d  806,  811-­‐‑12  (N.D.  Cal.  2013).  
   31.     Id.  at  812  (quoting  Food  Labeling:  Nutrient  Content  Claims,  General  
Principles,  Petitions,  Definition  of  Terms;  Definitions  of  Nutrient  Content  Claims  
for  the  Fat,  Fatty  Acid,  and  Cholesterol  Content  of  Food,  58  Fed.  Reg.  2302,  2407  
(Jan.  6,  1993)  [hereinafter  Fat  Content  Rules]).  
   32.     Food  Labeling:  Nutrient  Content  Claims,  General  Principles,  Petitions,  
Definition  of  Terms,  56  Fed.  Reg.  60421,  60466  (Nov.  27,  1991)  [hereinafter  General  
SHEPARD(DO  NOT  DELETE)   10/1/15    10:28  AM  
2014]   “NATURAL”  FOOD  LABELING   183  
In   1993,   spurred   by   the   NLEA,   the   Secretary   of   the  
Department  of  Health  and  Human  Services,  and  the  knowledge  
that  consumers  would  benefit   from  creating  a  definition  for  the  
term   natural,   the   FDA   sought   to   address   the   definition   of   the  
term   natural.33     When   questioning  whether   a   formal   definition  
and   plan   for   regulation   for   the   term   natural   was   feasible,   the  
agency   concluded   that   the   ambiguity   surrounding   the   use   of  
natural  has  resulted  in  misleading  claims  and  could  be  abated  if  
an   adequate  definition   for   the   term   existed.34     Nonetheless,   the  
FDA  recognized  that  there  are  “many  facets  of  this  issue  that  the  
agency   [would]   have   to   carefully   consider   if   it   undert[ook]   a  
rulemaking  to  define  the  term  ‘natural,’   [which  it  refused  to  do  
because]  of  resource  limitations  and  other  agency  priorities.”35  
Unfortunately,   today  “[t]he  word   ‘natural’   is  often  used   to  
convey   that  a   food   is  composed  only  of  substances   that  are  not  
manmade   and   is,   therefore,   somehow   more   wholesome.”36    
Companies  use  this  lack  of  regulation  to  advertise  their  products  
as  natural  despite  the  fact  that  the  majority  of  the  product  is  not  
completely   composed   of   natural   ingredients   or   is   processed   in  
such   a   way   that   no   longer   deems   the   product   worthy   of   a  
natural  advertisement.37    However,  the  FDA  has  been  known  to  
issue   warning   letters   to   companies   using   the   term   natural   in  
their   product   labels   for   foods   that   contain   specific  
preservatives.38     For  example,  on  August  16,  2001,  the  FDA  sent  
a  warning  letter  to  Oak  Tree  Farm  Dairy,  which  stated:  
The   term   ‘all   natural’   on   the   “OAKTREE   ALL  
NATURAL   LEMONADE”   label   is   inappropriate  
because   the   product   contains   potassium   sorbate.    
Although   FDA   has   not   established   a   regulatory  
 
Principles]).  
   33.     Fat  Content  Rules,  supra  note  31,  at  2407.  
   34.     Id.  
   35.     Id.  
   36.     Holk  v.  Snapple  Bev.  Corp.,  575  F.3d  329,  332  (3d  Cir.  2009)  (quoting  
General  Principles,  supra  note  32,  at  60466.  
   37.     See  Rangan,  supra  note  4.  
   38.     Janney  v.  Mills,  944  F.  Supp.  2d  806,  812  (N.D.  Cal.  2013).  
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definition   for   ‘natural,’   we   discussed   its   use   in   the  
preamble   to   the   food   labeling   final   regulations   (58  
Federal  Register  2407,   January  6,  1993,  copy  enclosed).    
FDA’s   policy   regarding   the   use   of   “natural,”   means  
nothing   artificial   or   synthetic  has  been   included   in,   or  
has  been  added  to,  a   food  that  would  not  normally  be  
expected  to  be  in  the  food.    The  same  comment  applies  
to   use   of   the   terms   ‘100   %   NATURAL’   and   “ALL  
NATURAL”  on   the   ‘OAKTREE  REAL  BREWED  ICED  
TEA’  label  because  it  contains  citric  acid.39  
On   August   29,   2001,   the   agency   submitted   a   similar  
warning   letter   to   the   Hirzel   Canning   Company,   stating   that   it  
inappropriately   used   the   term   “all   natural”   to   describe   its  
canned  tomatoes  as  calcium  chloride  and  citric  acid  were   listed  
as  added  ingredients.40    Finally,  on  November  16,  2011,  the  FDA  
sent  a  warning  letter  to  Alexia  Foods,  stating  that  the  company’s  
use   of   the   phrase   to   describe   its   Roasted  Red  Potatoes  &  Baby  
Portabella   Mushrooms   misbranded   the   product   as   they  
contained   disodium   dihydrogen   pyrophosphate,   a   synthetic  
chemical  preservative.  41  
The   agency   concluded   each   warning   letter   with   a  
recommendation  that  each  company  review  its  product  labels  to  
avoid   additional   misbranding   of   its   food   products.42      These  
warning  letters  have  been  viewed  as  a  step  in  the  right  direction  
as  they  suggest  that  the  FDA  is  adequately  regulating  use  of  the  
term.      In   fact,   food   companies,   similar   to   General   Mills,   have  
stated,   “these   letters   show   that   the   FDA   routinely   makes  
considered,   expert   judgments   about   what   products   and   food  
labels   warrant   administrative   action   for   non-­‐‑compliance   [sic]  
 
   39.     Id.  (emphasis  in  original).  
   40.     Id.  at  812,  814;  Fat  Content  Rules,  supra  note  31,  at  2407.  
   41.     Id.  at  813  (noting  that  the  FDA  also  claimed  the  addition  of  synthetic  
preservatives  “misbranded  within  the  meaning  of  section  403(a)(1)  of  the  Act  [21  
U.S.C.  343(a)(1)],  which  states  that  a  food  shall  be  deemed  to  be  misbranded  if  its  
labeling  is  false  or  misleading  in  any  particular.”  
   42.     Id.  at  813.  
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with   its   informal   policy.”43      This   is   a   misguided   view   as   the  
agency  has  only  targeted  a  small  portion  of  companies  misusing  
the  term  natural  with  these  warning  letters;  the  same  amount  of  
products  continue  to  be  sold  on  a  daily  basis  baring  the  incorrect  
use   of   the   label.44      Nevertheless,   in   reaction   to   numerous  
lawsuits  challenging  the  use  of  the  term,  food  companies  are  just  
beginning   to   consider   removing   the   term   from   their   food  
packaging.45  
III.    WHY  THE  FDA’S  LACK  OF  DEFINITION  HAS  PREVIOUSLY  
PREVENTED  COURTS  FROM  RULING  ON  THIS  ISSUE  
A.  THE  LANHAM  ACT  AND  STANDING  TO  BRING  SUIT  
The   Lanham   Act   (the   Act),   enacted   in   1946,   authorizes  
companies  or  individuals  to  bring  suit  in  the  event  that  damage  
results   from   false  or  misleading  descriptions  or   representations  
of  products  sold  by  competing  companies.46  
While   extremely   helpful   in   preventing   companies   from  
misusing   terms   to   advertise   or  market   their  products,   case   law  
 
   43.     Id.  at  812.  




   45.     Id.  
   46.     15  U.S.C  §  1125(a)  (2012).    The  Act  works  to  prevent  false  advertising  by  
allowing:    
Any  person  who,  on  or  in  connection  with  any  goods  or  services,  or  any  
container  for  goods,  uses  in  commerce  any  word,  term,  name,  symbol,  or  
device,  or  any  combination  thereof,  or  any  false  designation  of  origin,  false  
or  misleading  description  of  fact,  or  false  or  misleading  representation  of  
fact,  which  —    
(A)  is  likely  to  cause  confusion,  or  to  cause  mistake,  or  to  deceive  as  to  the  
affiliation,  connection,  or  association  of  such  person  with  another  person,  
or  as  to  the  origin,  sponsorship,  or  approval  of  his  or  her  goods,  services,  
or  commercial  activities  by  another  person,  or    
(B)  in  commercial  advertising  or  promotion,  misrepresents  the  nature,  
characteristics,  qualities,  or  geographic  origin  of  his  or  her  or  another  
person’s  goods,  services,  or  commercial  activities,  shall  be  liable  in  a  civil  
action  by  any  person  who  believes  that  he  or  she  is  or  is  likely  to  be  
damaged  by  such  act.      
   Id.  
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warns   that   the   Act   may   not   be   used   to   undermine   FDA  
authority.47      Therefore,  while   the  Act   aids   in   the   filing   of   suits  
against   competitor   companies   misusing   the   term   natural   to  
promote   sales,   courts   are   limited   in   the   ability   to   propose   an  
alternative  definition  or  regulation  for  the  use  of  the  term.48  
For  example,  “PhotoMedex  teaches  that  the  Lanham  Act  may  
not  be  used  as  a  vehicle   to  usurp,  preempt,  or  undermine  FDA  
authority.”49      In   PhotoMedex,   the   manufacturer   of   a   medical  
device  claimed  that  its  competitor  breached  the  Lanham  Act  by  
advertising   FDA   approval.50      Because   the   FDA   previously  
approved  a  similar  product,  the  Court  barred  the  claim  refusing  
to   usurp   the   FDA’s   authority.51      This   case   illustrates   the  
limitations  of  private  individuals  and  companies’.52  
PhotoMedex’s   progeny   has   applied   its   holding   in   similar  
cases  such  as  the  Fourth  Circuit’s  holding  in  Mylan  Labs.,  Inc.  v.  
Matkari,   which   confirmed   that   “courts   have   agreed   that   the  
FDCA   limits   claims  under   the  Lanham  Act.”53     A  plaintiff  may  
not,   for   example,   sue   under   the   Lanham   Act   to   enforce   the  
FDCA   or   its   regulations   because   allowing   such   a   suit   would  
undermine   Congress’s   decision   to   limit   enforcement   of   the  
FDCA  to  the  federal  government.54  
The   United   States   Supreme   Court   took   a   direct   stance   on  
this  issue  in  POM  Wonderful  LLC  v.  Coca-­‐‑Cola  Co.55     In  the  lower  
 
   47.     See  PhotoMedex,  Inc.  v.  Irwin,  601  F.3d  919,  924  (9th  Cir.  2010)  (“Because  
the  FDCA  forbids  private  rights  of  action  under  the  statue,  a  private  action  brought  
under  the  Lanham  Act  may  not  be  pursued  when,  as  here,  the  claim  would  require  
litigation  of  the  alleged  underlying  FDCA  violation  in  a  circumstances  where  the  
FDA  has  not  yet  itself  concluded  that  there  was  such  a  violation.”).  
   48.     E.g.,  PhotoMedex,  601  F.3d  at  924;  POM  Wonderful  LLC  v.  Coca-­‐‑Cola  Co.,  
679  F.3d  1170,  1175-­‐‑1176  (9th  Cir.  2012).    This  article  later  discusses  the  Supreme  
Court’s  decision  to  overturn  the  ninth  circuit’s  holding  in  POM  Wonderful.  
   49.     Id.  
   50.     PhotoMedex,  601  F.3d  at  923.  
   51.     Id.  at  930-­‐‑31.  
   52.     See  PhotoMedex,  601  F.3d  at  924.  
   53.     POM  Wonderful,  679  F.3d  at  1175-­‐‑6;  See,  e.g.,  Mylan  Labs.,  Inc.  v.  Matkari,  7  
F.3d  at  1139.  
   54.     POM  Wonderful,  679  F.3d  at  1175-­‐‑6.  
   55.     POM  Wonderful  LLC  v.  Coca-­‐‑Cola  Co.,  No.  12-­‐‑761,  slip  op.  (S.  Ct.  June  12,  
2014).  
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court,   POM   Wonderful   argued   that   Coca-­‐‑Cola   violated   the  
Lanham   Act’s   false-­‐‑advertising   provision   by   misnaming,  
mislabeling,   and   falsely   advertising   and   marketing   a   juice  
product.56      That   case   affirmed   the   Ninth   Circuit’s   holding   in  
PhotoMedex   by   “resolv[ing]   not   ‘to   usurp   the   FDA’s  
prerogative’”   when   questioning   whether   a   competitor   juice  
company’s   advertisements   violated   the   Lanham   Act.57      While  
POM  Wonderful  did  not   challenge  Coca-­‐‑Cola’s  use  of   the   term  
natural,  as  no  such  claim  was  made  on  the  product  packaging,  it  
did  argue  against  similar  name  and  labeling  claims.58  
At  the  circuit  level,  POM  Wonderful  further  contended  that  
Coca-­‐‑Cola’s   use   of  misleading   labels   permitted   “(1)   Coca–Cola  
[to]  give  its  product  a  name  that  refers  to  juices  that  provide  the  
characterizing   flavor,   and   [that]   (2)   those   juices   need   not   be  
predominant  by  volume  if  Coca–Cola  states  that  those  juices  are  
not   predominant.”59      As   a   progeny   of   PhotoMedex,   the   Ninth  
Circuit   found   that   ruling   on   POM   Wonderful’s   challenge   to  
Coca-­‐‑Cola’s   juice   named   “POMegranate   Blueberry   Flavored  
Blend   of   5   Juices”   would   require   the   court   to   undermine   the  
FCDA’s   regulations   and   authority.60      In   response,   the   Ninth  
Circuit   held   “that   the   FDCA   and   its   regulations   bar   pursuit   of  
both   the   name   and   labeling   aspects   of   POM   [Wonderful]’s  
Lanham  Act  claim.”61  
In   doing   so,   the   Ninth   Circuit   essentially   established   the  
FDA’s   controlling   authority   in   determining   the   amount   of  
regulation   necessary   to   prevent   deception   from   a   company’s  
packaging   explaining   that   “under   [the   court’s]   precedent,   for   a  
court   to  act  when  the  FDA  has  not  .  .  .  would  risk  undercutting  
 
   56.     POM  Wonderful,  679  F.3d  at  1174.  
   57.     Id.  at  1176  (citing  PhotoMedex,  601  F.3d  at  928).  
   58.     Id.  at  1172.  
   59.     Id.  at  1177.  
   60.     Id.  
   61.     Id.  at  1176.    Accordingly,  the  Court  in  Pom  Wonderful  ultimately  affirmed  
the  lower  court’s  award  of  summary  judgment,  which  barred  Pom  Wonderful’s  
Lanham  Act  claim  against  Coca-­‐‑Cola  Company’s  use  of  misleading  terminology  to  
market  a  juice  product.    Id.  at  1179.  
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the  FDA’s  expert  judgments  and  authority.”62    In  other  words,  if  
the   FDA   considered   regulation   of   a   term   necessary,   to   ensure  
that  it  could  be  understood  by  the  ordinary  individual.63  
Surprisingly,   the  United   States   Supreme  Court’s   review   of  
the  case  held  that  “the  FDCA  and  the  Lanham  Act  complement  
each   other   in   the   federal   regulation   of   misleading   labels   [as]  
Congress  did  not  intend  the  FDCA  to  preclude  [the]  Lanham  Act  
suits   like   POM’s.”64      Justice   Kennedy   clarified   this   opinion  
stating  that  the  FDCA  “does  not  preclude  Lanham  Act  suits.    In  
consequence,   food   and  beverage   labels   regulated  by   the  FDCA  
are  not,   under   the   terms  of   either   statute,   off   limits   to  Lanham  
Act  claims.”65      Justice  Kennedy  explained  that   the  FDA  and  the  
Lanham  Act  “complement  each  other,”  and  that  “it  would  show  
disregard   for   the   congressional   design   to   hold   that   Congress  
nonetheless   intended   one   federal   statute   to   preclude   the  
operation  of  the  other.”66  
Indicating  that  while  the  two  statutes  are  to  work  in  unison,  
the  opinion  also  illustrated  that  each  statute  “has  its  own  scope  
and   purpose”   explaining   that   “the   Lanham   Act   protects  
commercial   interests   against   unfair   competition,   while   the  
FDCA  protects  public  health  and  safety.”67     As  the   two  statutes  
have   distinct   purposes,   “if   Lanham   Act   claims   were   to   be  
precluded   then   commercial   interests—and   indirectly   the  public  
at   large—could  be   left  with   less  effective  protection   in   the   food  
and  beverage   labeling  realm  than  in  many  other,   less  regulated  
industries.”68  
Highlighting   that   “[i]t   is   unlikely   that   Congress   intended  
the   FDCA’s   protection   of   health   and   safety   to   result   in   less  
 
   62.     Id.  at  1177.  
   63.     21  U.S.C.  §  343(f)  (2012).  
   64.     POM  Wonderful  LLC  v.  Coca-­‐‑Cola  Co.,  No.  12-­‐‑761,  slip  op.  at  17  (S.  Ct.  
June  12,  2014).  
   65.     Id.  at  *9.  
   66.     Id.  at  *11  (citing  J.E.M.  Ag  Supply,  Inc.  v.  Pioneer  Hi–Bred  Int’l,  Inc.,  534  
U.S.  124,  144  (2001)  (stating  “we  can  plainly  regard  each  statute  as  effective  because  
of  its  different  requirements  and  protections”)).  
   67.     Id.    
   68.     Id.  at  *12.  
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policing   of   misleading   food   and   beverage   labels,”   that   case  
ultimately  transforms  older  precedent,  by  granting  lower  courts  
the   ability   to   acknowledge   instances   where   companies   have  
purposely   attempted   to   mislead   consumers.69      While   the  
Supreme  Court’s  holding  in  POM  Wonderful  LLC  v.  Coca-­‐‑Cola  Co.  
may  grant   lower   courts   the   ability   to   limit   a   company’s   use   of  
the   term   natural   in   a   misleading   manner,   it   does   not   directly  
grant   the   courts   the   ability   to  propose   a  manageable  definition  
that   will   regulate   all   food   companies’   use   of   the   term  
indefinitely.70  
Similarly,  additional  precedent  shows  that  individuals  have  
standing   to   bring   these   types   of   claims.71      In  Astiana   v.   Ben   &  
Jerry’s   Homemade,   Inc.,   consumers   sued   Ben   &   Jerry’s  
Homemade,   Inc.   [hereinafter   Ben   &   Jerry’s]   after   buying  
products   advertised   as   all   natural  when   in   fact   they   contained  
processed   ingredients.72      The   consumers   argued   that   Ben   &  
Jerry’s  alkalized  cocoa  was  processed  with  potassium  carbonate,  
synthetic,  man-­‐‑made  ingredient  and  not  natural.73  
The   consumers   claimed   that   they   consciously   pay   a  
premium   for   all   natural   foods   and   consistently   abstain   from  
purchasing   foods   not   derived   from   natural   ingredients   or  
processes;   ultimately   they   relied   on   the   representation   that   the  
ice   cream   was   all   natural.74      Ben   &   Jerry’s   refuted   these  
arguments  by  insisting  that  the  terms  all  natural  and  natural  are  
terms  of   art.75      Ben  &   Jerry’s   further   argued   that   in   order   for   a  
consumer   to   be   deceived   by   the   labeling   on   its   packaging,   the  
consumer  would  need  to  be  familiar  with  the  policy  statement  of  
the  term  natural  set  forth  by  the  FDA;  recognize  that  the  term  all  
natural  was   used   on   the   package;   consider   that   the   use   of   this  
 
   69.     Id.    
   70.     See  Id.  
   71.     15  U.S.C.  §  1125(a)  (2012).  
   72.     Astiana  v.  Ben  &  Jerry’s  Homemade,  Inc.,  No.  C  10-­‐‑4387,  2011  U.S.  Dist.  
WL  at  *2.  (describing  additional  fraud  and  false  advertising  claims  brought  by  
consumers).  
   73.     Id.    
   74.     Id.  at  *8.  
   75.     Id.  
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term  indicated  that  Ben  &  Jerry’s  use  of  alkali  in  the  Dutch  cocoa  
ingredient  was  natural;  and  finally,  rely  on  the  claim,  all  natural,  
when  choosing  to  purchase  the  product.76  
The   court   disagreed   with   this   proposed   four-­‐‑prong   test,  
which   ultimately   evaluates   two   elements:   (1)   whether   average  
consumers   are   prone   to   deception,   and   (2)   if   a   reasonable  
consumer   “would   assume   the   words   ‘all   natural’   on   the   label  
meant   ‘alkalized   with   sodium   carbonate   and   not   potassium  
carbonate.’”77     While   the   court   refused   to   analyze  whether   the  
all-­‐‑natural   claim   on   the   packaging   was   fraud   under   FDA  
regulation,  it  did  find  that  the  consumers  alleged  enough  facts  to  
maintain   a   12(b)(6)   motion   of   fraud   thereby   confirming   that  
individuals  have  standing  to  bring  these  types  of  claims.78  
B.  PRIMARY  JURISDICTION  
Similar   to   the   Ninth   Circuit’s   holding   in   the   Lanham   Act  
lawsuits,  primary  jurisdiction  restricts  courts  from  usurping  the  
FDA’s   authority  when   evaluating  whether   the   use   of   the   term  
natural   is   misleading   to   consumers.79      Primary   jurisdiction,  
which   does   not   involve   jurisdiction   at   all,   is   predicated   on  
judicial   restraint.80      The   Supreme   Court   recognized   “in   the  
development   of   administrative   agencies   that   coordination  
between   traditional   judicial  machinery   and   these   agencies  was  
necessary   if   consistent   and   coherent   policy   were   to   emerge.”81    
This  Court  has  “redefined   the  doctrine  of  primary   jurisdiction”  
to   specifically  apply  “to  a   claim  properly   cognizable   in   court—
i.e.  a  claim  over  which  a  court  has  subject-­‐‑matter   jurisdiction—
where   the   claim,   or   some   portion   of   it,   lies   within   the  
 
   76.     Id.  at  **8-­‐‑9.  
   77.     Id.  at  *9.  
   78.     Id.  at  *18.  
   79.     See  Port  of  Boston  Marine  Terminal  Ass'ʹn  v.  Rederiaktiebolaget  
Transatlantic,  400  U.S.  62,  68  (1970)  (citing  Texas  &  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Abilene  Cotton  
Oil  Co.,  204  U.S.  426,  441  (1907)).  
   80.     James  W.  Hilliard,  Tapping  Agency  Expertise:  The  Doctrine  of  Primary  
Jurisdiction,  96  ILL.  B.J.  256,  257  (2008).  
   81.     Port  of  Boston  Marine  Terminal  Ass'ʹn,  400  U.S.  62  at  68.  
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competence   of   an   administrative   agency.”82      If   primary  
jurisdiction   applies,   referral   of   the   issue   to   the   agency   stays  
“further   proceedings,   and   provides   the   parties   a   reasonable  
opportunity  to  seek  an  administrative  ruling.”83  
In   the   realm   of   food   labeling,   primary   jurisdiction   was   a  
central   issue   in  Astiana   v.  Hain  Celestial  Grp.84      In   that   case,   the  
court   evaluated  whether   Hain   Celestial’s   use   of   the   terms   “all  
natural,”   “pure   natural,”   and   “pure,   natural   &   organic”   on  
cosmetic   product   labels   were   false   or   misleading   due   to   the  
artificial   and/or   synthetic   materials   contained   in   all   of   the  
products.85      Since   the   court   found  no  definitive   FDA  definition  
for  the  term  natural,  it  refused  to  decide  whether  use  of  the  term  
was   false   or  misleading;   it  would   risk   undercutting   the   FDA’s  
expert  authority  and  judgments.86  
Similarly,   in   Janney   v.   Gen.   Mills,   the   Northern   District   of  
California  evaluated  whether  Janney’s  claim  that  advertisements  
and   packaging   of   Nature   Valley   products,   primarily   granola  
bars,   sold  and  manufactured  by  General  Mills  were  misleading  
or   deceptive   as   the   granola   bars   were   labeled   as   natural   even  
though   they   contained   “high   fructose   corn   syrup   (HFCS),   high  
maltose   corn   syrup   (HMCS),   and/or   maltodextrin   and   rice  
maltodextrin   (Maltodextrin).”87      Janney   argued   that   each  
ingredient   was   highly   processed   and   use   of   the   term   was  
deceptive   and   confusing   to   consumers   and   should   be   reserved  
for   products   that   are   minimally   processed   and   do   not   contain  
synthetic  or  artificial  ingredients.88  
Janney  also  contended  that  the  name,  Nature  Valley,  as  well  
as   the   images   of   nature   posted   on   the   company’s  website   and  
 
   82.     Hilliard,  supra  note  80,  at  257.  
   83.     Id.    
   84.     Astiana  v.  Hain  Celestial  Grp.  Inc.,  905  F.  Supp.  2d  1013,  1016-­‐‑17  (N.D.  Cal.  
2012).  
   85.     Id.  at  1014.  
   86.     Id.  at  1016.  
   87.     Janney  v.  Mills,  944  F.  Supp.  2d  806,  809  (N.D.  Cal.  2013).  
   88.     Id.  
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accompanying  social  media,  reinforced  the  idea  of  naturalness.89    
By   asserting,   Janney   argued   that   General   Mills   sought   to  
“capitalize   on   consumers’   preference   for   all-­‐‑natural   foods   and  
the   association   between   such   foods   and   a   wholesome   way   of  
life.”90     Janney  supported  this  argument  by  stating  that  she  was  
originally  driven   to  purchase   the  granola  bars   in   an  attempt   to  
“consume   all-­‐‑natural   foods   for   reasons   of   health,   safety,   and  
environmental   preservation,”   because   she   believed   that   “all-­‐‑
natural  foods  contain  only  ingredients  that  occur  in  nature  or  are  
minimally  processed,  and  they  would  not  include  HFCS,  HMCS,  
and  Maltodextrin  among  such  ingredients.”91  
General  Mills  argued  food  products   labeled  as  natural  was  
under  the  FDA’s  regulatory  authority  and  as  such  dismissal  was  
proper   when   applying   the   four-­‐‑prong   test   of   primary  
jurisdiction.92      The      doctrine   applied   when   “(1)   the   need   to  
resolve  an  issue  that  (2)  has  been  placed  by  Congress  within  the  
jurisdiction   of   an   administrative   body   having   regulatory  
authority   (3)   pursuant   to   a   statute   that   subjects   an   industry   or  
activity  to  a  comprehensive  regulatory  authority  that  (4)  requires  
expertise  or  uniformity  in  administration.”93  
General   Mills   supported   this   argument   by   asserting   that  
Janney’s  claim  required   the  court   to  determine:   (1)  whether   the  
term  natural  on  the  Nature  Valley  packaging  was  misleading  or  
false;  (2)  that  food  labeling  is  an  issue  that  Congress  has  placed  
within   the   primary   jurisdiction   of   the   FDA;   (3)   that   labels   are  
unquestionably   “subject   to   comprehensive   regulatory   authority  
by  the  FDA  (and  that  under  that  authority,  the  FDA  has  adopted  
a   ‘policy’   for   the   use   of   ‘natural,’   which   it   enforces   through  
 
   89.     Id.  
   90.     Id.  
   91.     Id.  at  809-­‐‑10.  
   92.     Id.  at  811.  
   93.     Id.  (citing  Clark  v.  Time  Warner  Cable,  523  F.3d  1110,  1114-­‐‑15  (9th  Cir.  
2008);  see  also,  Syntek  Semiconductor  Co.  v.  Microchip  Tech.  Inc.,  307  F.3d  775,  781  
(9th  Cir.  2002))  (“relevant  factors  are  whether  agency  determination  lies  at  the  heart  
of  task  assigned  to  agency  by  Congress;  whether  agency  expertise  is  required  to  
unravel  intricate  technical  facts;  whether  the  agency  determination  would  
materially  aid  the  court”).  
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administrative   action);   and   that   the   FDA’s   enforcement   of   its  
‘natural’   policy   for   food   labeling   is   an   issue   that   requires   the  
agency’s  expertise  and  uniformity  in  administration.”94  
General  Mills  also  claimed  that  the  FDA’s  warning  letters  to  
companies  in  violation  of  use  of  terms  of  art,  illustrate  the  FDA’s  
enforcement   of   its   policy,   and   that   any   action   on   behalf   of   the  
court   to   “usurp   the   agency’s   role   and  decide   for   itself  whether  
any   such   action   is   appropriate   ‘would   risk   undercutting   the  
FDA’s   expert   judgments   and   authority.’”95      Janney   responded  
that  since  the  case  only  challenged  whether  the  food  labels  were  
misleading,   a   question   not   answered   solely   by   FDA   expertise,  
she  was  not  requesting  the  court  to  define  the  term  natural,  but  
rather  to  rule  on  a  question  of  state  law:  if  the  marketing  General  
Mills   used   to   advertise   its   Nature   Valley   products   misled  
reasonable  consumers.96  
The   court   determined   that   the   question   of   whether  
ingredients   in   foods   advertised   as   natural   involves   referencing  
the   FDA’s   regulation,   which   ultimately   requires   the   FDA’s  
expertise   and   uniformity   in   administration.97      Therefore,   the  
court   relied   on   the   Ninth   Circuit’s   holding   in   POM  Wonderful  
and  Hain  Celestial  to  justify  the  denial  of  Janney’s  motion,  based  
on  primary  jurisdiction  grounds,  asserting  that  the  court  was  not  
entitled   to   rule   on   an   issue   dealing   with   the   FDA’s   expertise;  
“dismissal  in  deference  to  that  agency  is  the  proper  result—even  
if  no  formal  regulation  has  been  adopted.”98  
Similarly   in   Brazil   v.   Dole   Food   Co.,   Dole   Food   urged   the  
court  “to  let  the  FDA  do  its  job,”  and  to  stay  or  dismiss  the  case  
instead   of   creating   ‘a   patchwork   of   court-­‐‑made   labeling   law   in  
an  attempt  to  combat  Brazil’s  assertion  that  its  food  labels  were  
deceptive  to  consumers.99     Nonetheless,  the  court  found  Brazil’s  
 
   94.     Janney,  944  F.  Supp.  2d  at  811.  
   95.     Id.  at  813.  
   96.     Id.  at  814.  
   97.     Id.  
   98.     Id.  (citing  POM  Wonderful  LLC  v.  Coca-­‐‑Cola  Co.,  679  F.3d  1170,  1177  (9th  
Cir.  2012)).  
   99.     Id.    
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claim   could   be   resolved   on   the   FDA’s   existing   definitions.100    
Therefore,  the  court  retained  jurisdiction  and  permitted  the  case  
to  advance  based  on  the  fact  that  no  FDA  regulations  would  be  
created  or  overruled,  as  they  would  merely  be  evaluated.101  
Brazil  v.  Dole  Food  Co.  essentially  illustrates  that  it  is  possible  
for  courts   to  compare   the  commercial  speech   in  question   to   the  
FDA  definitions   and   regulations.   Presumably   anything   beyond  
mere   comparison   of   speech   to   the   FDA   definitions   and  
regulations,   such   a   development   of   an   applicable   definition,  
would   not   be   permitted,   as   these   types   of   evaluations   would  
require   courts   to   override   the   FDA’s   expertise   and   authority  
which  primary  jurisdiction  seemingly  restricts.  
C.  PREEMPTION  
Preemption   is   a   doctrine   that   identifies   certain   issues   of  
national   character   as   so   important   that   federal   law   preempts  
over  state  or  local  law.102    Preemption  occurs  in  three  situations:  
(1)  federal  law  expressly  preempts  a  specific  provision;  (2)  courts  
conclude   that   Congress   intended   total   preemption;   or   (3)   a  
federal   and   state   law   conflict.103      Prior   case   law   suggests   that  
mere   comparison   of   the   use   of   the   term   natural   to   the   FDA’s  
policy   statement   is   not   preempted,   thereby   allowing   courts   to  
rule   on   its   use.104      Additionally,   “Given   that   (1)   regulating   the  
proper   marketing   of   food   has   traditionally   been   within   states’  
historic  police  powers,  and   (2)   there   is  no  clear   indication   from  
Congress   that,   in   the   process   of   attempting   to   strengthen   and  
unify  nutrition  food  labeling,  it  intended  to  preclude  states  from  
affording   state   consumers   protection   from   misbranded   food  
products.”105  
 
   100.     Id.  at  960.  
   101.     Id.  
   102.     Andre,  supra  note  9,  at  234.    Under  this  doctrine,  neither  a  state  nor  local  
authority  may  pass  a  law  inconsistent  with  federal  law.    Id.  
   103.     Id.  
   104.     See  Holk  v.  Snapple  Bev.  Corp.,  575  F.3d  329,  342  (3d  Cir.  2009);  see  also,  
Brazil  v.  Dole  Food  Co.,  935  F.  Supp.  2d  947,  959  (N.D.  Cal.  2013).  
   105.     Brazil,  935  F.  Supp.  2d  at  958.  
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This   is   visible  most   notoriously   in  Holk   v.   Snapple   Beverage  
Corp.,  where  the  Third  Circuit  evaluated  whether  an  individual’s  
claim   that  Snapple  Beverage’s  use  of   the   term  all  natural  on   its  
product-­‐‑packaging   label   was   preempted   and   found   that   the  
FDA’s  authority  does  not  have  the  ability  to  preempt  conflicting  
state  law.106    In  that  case,  the  Third  Circuit  neglected  to  evaluate  
the   issue  of  primary   jurisdiction  merely  concluding   that  Holk’s  
claim  was  not  preempted.  
Holk   sued   Snapple   Beverage,   a  manufacturer   of   juice   and  
tea   beverages,   alleging   several   claims:   Snapple   products  
contained   HFCS   and   therefore   were   not   “All   Natural.”      In  
addition,   the  beverages  were  not  “Made   from  the  Best  Stuff  on  
Earth”   and   some   beverages   were   falsely   labeled,   for   example,  
the  Acai  Blackberry  Juice,  despite  the  absence  of  acai  berry  juice  
or   blackberry   juice.107      The   case   was   subsequently   removed   to  
federal  court.108    
Snapple  Beverage  argued  that  preemption  applied  to  Holk’s  
claim  because  it  stood  as  an  obstacle  to  federal  law;  the  FDA  had  
a  policy  statement  for  the  term  natural  and  that  the  policy  would  
be  challenged  by  Holk’s  suit  that  involved  evaluating  conditions  
of  the  term  not  yet  determined  by  the  FDA.109    Snapple  Beverage  
supported   this   argument,   claiming   that   state   law  was   required  
to   yield   to   any   federal   authority   that   generates   constant  
standards—the  FDA  in  this  case.110    Holk  countered  that  Snapple  
Beverage   waived   its   right   to   express   preemption   as   it   did   not  
introduce   the   claim   in  District  Court.111     Additionally,   the   state  
causes   are   not   “an   obstacle   to   federal   objectives   because   there  
are   no   federal   requirements   in   place   regarding   the   term  
 
   106.     Holk,  575  F.3d  at  332,  342.  
   107.     Id.  at  332-­‐‑33.    Holk’s  claims  were  based  on  the  New  Jersey  Consumer  Fraud  
Act,  breach  of  express  warranty,  breach  of  the  implied  warranty  of  merchantability,  
and  unjust  enrichment  and  common  law  restitution    Id.  
   108.     Id.  at  331.  
   109.     Id.  at  339  (addressing  the  absence  of  a  definition  for  the  term  “natural”  
provided  by  the  FDA).  
   110.     Id.  at  339-­‐‑40.  
   111.     Id.  at  335.  
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natural.”112     Moreover,   her   claim  did   not   “conflict  with   federal  
law   because,   even   if   she   obtained   a   favorable   verdict,   Snapple  
Beverage   would   not   be   required   to   undertake   a   specific  
corrective  action.”113  
After   careful   evaluation,   the   Third   Circuit   determined  
FDA’s  policy  statement  on  use  of  the  term  natural  did  not  have  a  
preemptive   effect   because   the   FDA   knew   that   a   relevant   and  
applicable  definition  was  “of  considerable  interest  to  consumers  
and  industry,”  and  refused  to  generate  such  a  definition.114    The  
court  further  stated  that,  “[a]s  a  result,  there  is  no  conflict  in  this  
case  because  there  is  no  FDA  policy  with  which  state  law  could  
conflict.”115    The  court  supported  this  conclusion  by  stating  that,  
“a   search   of   the   Federal   Register   results   in   neither   earlier  
references   to   this  policy  nor  other  requests   for  comments   [from  
concerned   citizens]   on   the   use   of   the   term   ‘natural,’”   and  
because  “the  FDA  did  not  appear   to  consider  all   the  comments  
received,”  “the  record  demonstrates   that   the  FDA  arrived  at   its  
policy   without   the   benefit   of   public   input.”116      The   court   also  
stated,   “that   if   the   term   ‘natural’   [was]   adequately  defined,   the  
ambiguity   surrounding   use   of   this   term   that   results   in  
misleading   claims   could   be   abated.”117      Nonetheless,   since   the  
FDA  has  declined  to  define   the   term,   there   is  continued   lack  of  
 
   112.     Id.  339-­‐‑40  (internal  quotations  omitted).  
   113.     Id.  at  340.  
   114.     Id.  (citing  Fat  Content  Rules,  supra  note  31  at  2397).  “Because  the  District  
Court  found  that  Holk’s  claims  were  preempted,  it  did  not  address  Snapple’s  
primary  jurisdiction  argument  .  .  .  .”  Id.  at  342  n.2.    Because  Holk  v.  Snapple  remains  
an  outlier  among  precedence,  it  is  highly  presumable  that  had  the  Third  Circuit  
directly  questioned  the  issue  of  primary  jurisdiction,  it  would  not  have  permitted  
the  claim  to  advance  based  on  the  fact  that  the  court  would  have  had  to  rule  on  
Holk’s  challenge  which  involved  the  interpretation  of  the  term  “natural.”  See  
Sprietsma  v.  Mercury  Marine,  537  U.S.  51,  65  (2002)  (stating  “[b]ecause  of  resource  
limitations  and  other  agency  priorities,  FDA  is  not  undertaking  rulemaking  to  
establish  a  definition  for  ‘natural’  at  this  time”).  
   115.     Holk,  575  F.3d  at  342.  
   116.     Id.  at  341.    Most  importantly,  the  court  noted  that  an  important  comment  
ignored  by  the  FDA  “questioned  whether  restrictions  on  the  use  of  ‘natural’  could  
raise  First  Amendment  concerns,”  and  the  “FDA  did  not  respond  to  this  comment,  
as  it  declared  it  moot  in  light  of  its  decision  not  to  proceed  with  a  definition.”  Id.  
(citing  Fat  Content  Rules,  supra  note  31  at  2397).    
   117.     Id.    
SHEPARD(DO  NOT  DELETE)   10/1/15    10:28  AM  
2014]   “NATURAL”  FOOD  LABELING   197  
support  for  a  preemption  argument.  
Therefore,   as   prior   case   law   shows,   claims   against  
companies’  use  of  the  term  natural  are  not  preempted  based  on  
the  fact  that  states  have  the  right  to  regulate  the  use  of  the  term  
within   the   FDA’s   current   policy   statement.      Further,   the  
holdings   in  Holk  and  POM  Wonderful  both  propose  an  excellent  
avenue  to  circumvent  the  primary  jurisdiction  bar  for  courts  by  
stating  that  when  a  government  agency  fails  to  address  issues  of  
material   importance   to   the   general   public,   the   courts   may  
address   the   issue.118      Since   the   FDA  has   declined   to   define   the  
term  natural,  and  because  a  definition  is  of  considerable  interest  
to  both  consumers  and  the  food  production  industry,  this  lack  of  
regulation   may   allow   courts   to   restrict   the   use   of   the   term  
beyond   the   FDA’s   current   policy   statement.   Nevertheless,   it  
remains   imperative   that   Congress   takes   action   to   redefine   the  
term   to   ensure   that   all   claims   are   successfully   regulated   in  
court.119  
IV.    PRIOR  CASE  LAW  REGULATING  COMMERCIAL  SPEECH  
UNDER  THE  FIRST  AMENDMENT  
Primary   jurisdiction   and   preemption   usually   prevent   courts  
from   usurping   the   FDA’s   authority   when   comparing   whether  
use   of   the   term   is   misleading   beyond   the   current   policy  
statement  of   the   term.     To  circumvent   this   issue,  an  analysis  of  
the  United  States  Supreme  Court’s  holding  in  Central  Hudson  Gas  
&  Electric  Corp.  v.  Public  Serv.  Comm’n  of  New  York  clarifies   that  
Congress   has   a   substantial   interest   in   regulating   commercial  
speech.120      In   doing   so,   the   Court   adopted   a   four-­‐‑prong   test  
 
   118.     Id.  at  342;  see  generally,  POM  Wonderful  LLC  v.  Coca-­‐‑Cola  Co.,  No.  12-­‐‑761,  
slip  op.  at  17  (S.  Ct.  June  12,  2014).  
   119.     Glen  G.  Lammi,  Class  Actions  Challenging  Use  of  ‘Natural’  on  Food  Labels  
Begin  to  Founder,  FORBES,  (NOV.  4,  2013),  
http://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2013/11/04/class-­‐‑actions-­‐‑challenging-­‐‑use-­‐‑of-­‐‑
natural-­‐‑on-­‐‑food-­‐‑labels-­‐‑begin-­‐‑to-­‐‑founder  (describing  how  preemption  arguments  
would  fail  as  the  FDA  has  no  regulated  definition).      
   120.     Cent.  Hudson  Gas  &  Elec.  Corp.  v.  Pub.  Serv.  Comm'ʹn  of  N.Y.,  447  U.S.  
557,  561-­‐‑562  (1980);  see  Int’l  Dairy  Foods  Ass’n  v.  Boggs,  622  F.3d  628,  636  (6th  Cir.  
2010)  (quoting  Bates  v.  State  Bar  of  Arizona,  433  U.S.  350,  374-­‐‑375  (1977))  
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which   analyzes   whether   the   government   has   the   ability   to  
restrict  commercial  speech  under  the  First  Amendment,  finding  
that:  “(1)  it  must  concern  lawful  activity  and  not  be  misleading;  
(2)   the   government’s   interest   must   be   substantial;   (3)   the  
regulation  must  directly  advance  the  government’s  interest;  and  
(4)   it   must   not   be   more   extensive   than   necessary   to   serve   the  
interest.”121    In  the  current  context,  this  would  allow  Congress  to  
insist   that   use   of   the   term   natural   be   limited   to   products  
deserving   of   the   current   policy   statement.      This  would   require  
companies   to   disclose   information   about   the   meaning   of   the  
term   on   a   product’s   packaging   or   by   prompting   the   FDA   to  
reevaluate   and   redefine   the   term   to   reduce   deceiving   or  
misleading  claims.  
Appropriately,   when   commercial   speech   is   distinctively  
misleading,  it  is  traditionally  not  granted  the  protections  offered  
by   the   First   Amendment.122      For   example,   in   Int’l   Dairy   Foods  
Ass’n   v.   Boggs,   the   Sixth   Circuit   noted   that   the   lower   court  
correctly:  
[C]oncluded   that   the   composition   claims   were  
misleading   and   therefore   not   entitled   to   any   First  
Amendment   protection.   “Misleading   advertising   may  
be  prohibited   entirely,”   including  where   the   speech   is  
“inherently   likely   to   deceive   or   where   the   records  
indicates   that   a   particular   form   or   method   of  
advertising  has  in  fact  been  deceptive.”123  
 
(addressing  application  of  the  Central  Hudson  test  and  claiming  that  in  these  
circumstances  the  “preferred  remedy  is  more  disclosure,  rather  than  less”  as  “it  
seems  peculiar  to  deny  the  consumer,  on  the  ground  that  the  information  is  
incomplete,  at  least  some  of  the  relevant  information  needed  to  reach  an  informed  
decision”).  
   121.     Kahan  &  Shapiro,  supra  note  6,  at  354.  (citing  Cent.  Hudson  Gas  &  Elec.  
Corp.,  447  U.S.  at  566).      
   122.     See  Sorrell  v.  IMS  Health  Inc.,  131  S.Ct.  2653,  2674  (2011)  (citing  44  
Liquormart,  Inc.  v.  Rhode  Island,  517  U.S.  484,  501  (1996)(opinion  of  Steven,  J.);  
Cent.  Hudson  Gas  &  Elec.  Corp.,  447  U.S.  at  563;  Virginia  State  Bd.  of  Pharmacy  v.  
Virginia  Citizens  Consumer  Council,  Inc.,  425  U.S.  748,  771-­‐‑2  (1976)  (describing  
cases  in  which  misleading  or  deceptive  speech  is  not  protected  under  the  First  
Amendment).  
   123.     Boggs,  622  F.3d  at  636  (citing  In  re  R.M.J.,  455  U.S.  191,  202-­‐‑03  (1982)).  
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In  that  case,  the  court  upheld  Congress’s  ability  to  “prevent  
the  dissemination  of  commercial  speech   that   is   false,  deceptive,  
or  misleading,”  based  on  the  fact  that  if  testing  would  detect  the  
presence  of  substances  proclaimed  to  be  missing  in  the  product,  
then   the   claims   on   the   packaging   would   be   inherently   false,  
deceptive,  and  misleading.124  
Likewise,   in  Williams  v.  Gerber  Prods.  Co.,   the  Ninth  Circuit  
directly   questioned   whether   the   First   Amendment   protected  
Gerber’s   commercial   speech,   specifically   advertising   its   fruit  
snacks   for   children,  which   claimed   that   the   snacks  were  made  
“with   fruit   juice   and   other   all   natural   ingredients”   on   the  
packaging.125    In  that  case,  the  consumers  brought  two  deception  
claims:   (1)   Gerber   deceived   its   customers   with   its   product  
packaging,  which   used   the  words   “fruit   juice”   and   pictures   of  
fruits,   including   peaches,   strawberries,   cherries,   and   oranges  
when  the  fruit  snacks  did  not  contain  fruit   juice   from  the  fruits  
featured;   and   (2)   the   packaging   described   the   snack   as   made  
“with   real   fruit   juice   and   other   all   natural   ingredients”   even  
though   the   first   two   ingredients   listed   on   the   nutrition   label  
were  corn  syrup  and  sugar.126  
In   weighing   this   issue,   the   court   evaluated   whether   a  
reasonable  consumer  would  look  past  the  misleading  claims  on  
the  front  of  the  packaging  to  determine  whether  the  small  print  
ingredient   label   on   the   side   of   the   box   matched   the  
advertisement   claims.127      While   the   court   found   that   the  
ingredient  list  complied  with  FDA  regulations,  it  also  concluded  
that   the  FDA’s   intent   in   requiring  an   ingredient   list  was  not   to  
permit  companies  from  correcting  or  shielding  themselves  from  
liability  of   the   false  or  misleading  claims  purported  on   front  of  
the  box.128  
As   the   court   found   that   a   reasonable   consumer   would  
 
   124.     Id.  at  636,  638  (citing  Zauderer  v.  Office  of  Disciplinary  Counsel  of  Supreme  
Court  of  Ohio,  471  U.S.  626,  638  (1985)).  
   125.     Williams  v.  Gerber  Products  Co.,  552  F.3d  934,  936  (9th  Cir.  2008).  
   126.     Id.  
   127.     Id.    
   128.     Id.  at  939.  
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presume   that   an   ingredient   list   would   merely   confirm   the  
representations   made   on   the   front   of   the   packaging,   the   court  
held   that   a   reasonable   consumer   could   be   deceived   by   the  
advertisements.129      This   holding   is   furthered   by   the   results   of  
studies   illustrating   that   consumers   would   have   to   read   data  
safety   sheets   filed  with   the  United   States   government   to   know  
exactly  which  ingredients  are  in  a  particular  food  product.130  
V.  ANALYSIS  OF  THE  CENTRAL  HUDSON  APPROACH  
As  previously  argued,  since  primary   jurisdiction  has  prevented  
courts   from   usurping   the   FDA’s   authority   by   evaluating   the  
term’s   definition   beyond   the   scope   of   the   current   policy  
statement,   Congress   should   codify   the   Central   Hudson   four-­‐‑
prong   test   to   regulate   commercial   speech  when  using   the   term  
natural  in  advertising  their  products.    Congress  may  do  so  as  (1)  
courts   have   previously   held   that   use   of   the   term   may   not   be  
misleading   to   consumers   because   the   FDA  has  not  defined   the  
term;   (2)   Congress   has   a   substantial   interest   in   regulating   the  
term;  (3)  regulation  will  advance  directly  from  this  interest;  and  
(4)  regulation  will  not  be  more  excessive  than  necessary  to  serve  
Congress’s  interest.  
A.  PRONG  ONE:  THE  SPEECH  IN  QUESTION  MUST  NOT  BE  
MISLEADING  
Prong  one  for  the  test  requires  that  the  speech  in  question  is  
lawful  and  not  misleading.131    While  courts  have  previously  held  
that   the   term  natural   could  be  misleading,   a  majority   of   courts  
find   use   of   the   term   not   to   be   misleading;   the   issue   may   be  
preempted   if   the   courts   are   required   to   question   whether   a  
 
   129.     Id.  at  939-­‐‑40.  
   130.     Stephanie  Strom,  Lawyers  From  Suits  Against  Big  Tobacco  Target  Food  Makers,  
N.Y.  TIMES,  Aug.  18,  2012,  available  at  
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/19/business/lawyers-­‐‑of-­‐‑big-­‐‑tobacco-­‐‑lawsuits-­‐‑
take-­‐‑aim-­‐‑at-­‐‑food-­‐‑industry.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.  
   131.     Cent.  Hudson  Gas  &  Elec.  Corp.  v.  Pub.  Serv.  Comm'ʹn,  447  U.S.  557,  566  
(1980).  
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specific  product  is  outside  the  realm  of  the  FDA’s  current  policy  
statement.132  
In  Int’l  Dairy  Foods  Ass’n  v.  Boggs,  the  Sixth  Circuit  reversed  
the  lower  court’s  decision  holding  the  composition  claims  about  
the   ingredients   in   milk   as   inherently   misleading   because   it  
implied   a   compositional   difference   between   conventional   milk  
and  milk  manufactured  with   rbST,   thereby  violating   the  FDA’s  
finding   that   no   measurable   difference   existed   between   the  
two.133      The   court’s   reasoned   that   a   compositional   claim   for  
conventional   milk,   milk   produced   with   rbST,   does   not   exist  
because   conventional  milk   has   been   found   to   contain   levels   of  
IGF-­‐‑1,  insulin-­‐‑like  growth  factor-­‐‑1  and  may  be  of  poorer  quality  
of   nonconventional   milk.134      Further,   the   court   insisted   that  
labeling   milk   as   “rbST   free”   creates   “a   meaningful   distinction  
between  conventional  .  .  .  milk  and  at  worst  potentially  misleads  
[consumers]   into   believing   that   a   compositionally   distinct  milk  
adversely  affects  their  health.”135    Therefore,  the  court  found  that  
based   on   those   circumstances,   the   compositional   claim   “rbST  
free”  was  “not  inherently  misleading.”136  
In   Kane   v.   Chobani,   Inc.,   consumers   claimed   Chobani’s  
 
   132.   See  POM  Wonderful  LLC  v.  Coca-­‐‑Cola  Co.,  679  F.3d  1170  (9th  Cir.  2012).  
   133.     622  F.3d  at  636.    
   134.     Id.;  see  also,  The  Surgeon  General,  Bone  Health  and  Osteoporosis:  A  Report  of  
the  Surgeon  General,  Chapter  Two:  Key  Messages,  1,  29,  DEP’T.  OF  HEALTH  AND  HUMAN  
SERVS.,  http://www.dsls.usra.edu/meetings/bonehealth_2005/SG_full_report.pdf    
It   acts   by   stimulating   the   production   of   another   hormone   called   insulin-­‐‑
like   growth   factor-­‐‑1   (IGF-­‐‑1),   which   is   produced   in   large   amounts   in   the  
liver  and  released  into  circulation.  IGF-­‐‑1  is  also  produced  locally  in  other  
tissues,   particularly   in   bone,   also   under   the   control   of   growth   hormone.  
The   growth   hormone   may   also   directly   affect   the   bone—that   is,   not  
through  IGF-­‐‑1.  Growth  hormone  is  essential  for  growth  and  it  accelerates  
skeletal  growth  at  puberty.    Decreased  production  of  growth  hormone  and  
IGF-­‐‑1  with  age  may  be  responsible  for  the  inability  of  older  individuals  to  
form   bone   rapidly   or   to   replace   bone   lost   by   resorption.   The   growth  
hormone/IGF-­‐‑1   system   stimulates   both   the   bone-­‐‑resorbing   and   bone-­‐‑
forming  cells,  but  the  dominant  effect  is  on  bone  formation,  thus  resulting  
in  an  increase  in  bone  mass.    
Id.  
   135.     Int’l  Dairy  Foods  Ass’n  v.  Boggs,  622  F.3d  628,  637  (6th  Cir.  2010).  
   136.     Id.  (but  c.f.  Int'ʹl  Dairy  Foods  Ass'ʹn  v.  Amestoy,  92  F.3d  67,  73  (2d  Cir.  1996)  
(describing  how  rBST  does  not  cause  harm  to  consumers  thereby  illustrating  the  
circuit  split).  
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products,  specifically  “Chobani  Greek  Yogurt”  were  mislabeled  
and   falsely   advertised   as   “all   natural”   with   “no   sugar   added”  
even   though   evaporated   cane   juice   (ECJ),   fruit   and   vegetable  
juice,   and   turmeric   were   listed   on   the   ingredient   list.137      The  
court   organized   the   consumers’   claim   into   two   separate  
allegations:   (1)   “ECJ   Allegations”   and   (2)   “All   Natural  
Claims”.138  
The  consumers  argued  the  following:  (1)  before  purchasing  
Chobani’s   yogurt   products,   the   consumers   believed   the   yogurt  
only   contained   natural   sugars   from   milk   and   fruit   not   added  
syrup  or  sugar  ingredients;  (2)  they  read  the  ingredient  list  prior  
to  their  purchase;  and  (3)  they  would  not  have  bought  Chobani’s  
products  if  they  were  made  aware  of  the  ECJ  or  other  unnatural  
ingredients   contained  within   the  yogurt.139     The   court   reasoned  
that   because   the   consumers   admitted   to   reading   the   products’  
labels,  which  “disclosed   the  presence  of   fruit  or  vegetable   juice  
concentrate”   reasonable   consumer   plausibly   could   be   aware   of  
the   added   ingredients,   thereby   dismissing   the   all   natural  
claim.140  
The  court’s  holding  in  Chobani,  Inc.  essentially  indicates  that  
companies’  use  of  the  term  natural  is  not  misleading  as  there  is  
no   statute   or   strict   FDA   definition   because   the   current   policy  
definition  is  not  inherently  misleading.141    This  allows  companies  
to  make  compositional   claims  based  on   the   ingredients   in   their  
products  if  they  clearly  state  the  actual  ingredients  contained  in  
a  product  on  a  package’s   ingredient   list.     Therefore,  due  to   this  
relevant  case  law,  prong  one  of  the  Central  Hudson  test  is  met  in  
cases  addressing  the  use  of  the  term  natural  on  food  products.  
B.  PRONG  TWO:  CONGRESS’S  INTEREST  MUST  BE  SUBSTANTIAL  
Congress   has   a   substantial   interest   in   restricting   the  
 
   137.     Kane  v.  Chobani,  Inc.,  973  F.  Supp.  2d  1120,  1123-­‐‑24  (N.D.  Cal.  2014).  
   138.     Id.  at  1124.  
   139.     Id.    
   140.     Id.  at  1137-­‐‑38.  
   141.     Id.  
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commercial   speech   of   companies   using   the   term  natural   in   the  
advertising  or  marketing  of  their  food  or  personal  care  products  
for  two  reasons:  (1)  to  advance  the  marketplace  of  healthy  food,  
and  (2)  to  increase  the  health  of  its  citizens.  
1.  ADVANCING  THE  MARKETPLACE  OF  HEALTHY  FOOD  
It   is  well   known   that   “consumers  will   pay  more   for   labels  
that   they   think   add   value,   and   consumers   are   also   misled   to  
believe   that   some   labels   are   meaningful,   and   that   deludes  
consumer   demand   and   it   deludes   moving   the   marketplace  
forward.”142     Additionally,   food  products   advertised   as  healthy  
are   often   more   expensive;   consumers   are   overcharged   when  
misguided   into   buying   foods   that   are   not   actually   natural.143    
Therefore,  as  Congress  has  a  “substantial  interest”  in  advancing  
a   fair   marketplace   for   natural   food   products,   cases   addressing  
products  purporting  to  be  natural  should  also  meet  prong  two  of  
the  Central  Hudson  test.144  
2.  INCREASING  THE  HEALTH  OF  UNITED  STATES  CITIZENS  
The  burden  of  increasing  the  health  of  United  States  citizens  
lies  directly  on  Congress’s   substantial   interest   in   increasing   the  
health   of   its   citizens.      Currently,   “obesity   related   conditions  
include  heart  disease,   stroke,   type  2  diabetes,  and  certain   types  
 
   142.     Id.  at  1136-­‐‑37.  
   143.     Andrea  Carlson  &  Elizabeth  Frazao,  Are  Healthy  Foods  Really  More  
Expensive?  It  Depends  on  How  you  Measure  the  Price,  Economic  Information  Bulletin  No.  
(EIB-­‐‑96)  May  2012,  1,  30  available  at  http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/eib-­‐‑
economic-­‐‑information-­‐‑bulletin/eib96.aspx  (stating  that,  “Cheap  food  that  provides  
few  nutrients  may  actually  be  ‘expensive’  for  the  consumer  from  a  nutritional  
economy  perspective,  whereas  a  food  with  a  higher  retail  price  that  provides  large  
amounts  of  nutrients  may  actually  be  quite  cheap.”);  see  Jean  Lyons  &  Martha  
Rumore,  Food  Labeling-­‐‑Then  and  Now,  2  J.  PHARMACY  &  L.  171,  180  (1994)  (discussing  
the  history  of  food  law  and  how,  for  example,  ‘The  grocery  store  has  become  the  
tower  of  Babel,  and  consumers  need  to  be  linguists,  scientists,  and  mind  readers  to  
understand  many  of  the  labels  they  see.).    The  goal  of  the  NLEA,  initiated  in  1990,  
was  to  help  the  public  make  informed  healthy  choices,  clear  up  confusion  on  
labeling  and  encourage  innovative  products.    Id.  at  181.  
   144.     Central  Hudson  Gas  &  Electric  Corp.  v.  Public  Serv.  Comm’n  of  N.Y.,  447  
U.S.  557,  564  (1980).  
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of   cancer,   some   of   the   leading   causes   of   death.”145     While   each  
may   be   directly   related   to   an   individual’s   diet,   obesity   is   the  
most  prominent  shared  factor.    There  are  approximately  400,000  
deaths   in   the  United  States  each  year  attributed   to   this  disease,  
which   ultimately   results   in   government   spending   in   excess   of  
$122.9  billion  a  year.146      In   fact,   in  2008  “[t]he  estimated  annual  
medical  cost  of  obesity  in  the  [United  States]  was  $147  billion.”147  
This   accounted   to   medical   bills   that   were   $1,429   higher   for  
people   who   were   obese   versus   those   of   an   average   weight.148    
With  a  rate  this  high  and  continuously  increasing,  it  is  necessary  
for  Congress  to  intervene  and  help  combat  the  crisis.  
The   United   States   Surgeon   General   identified   that   an  
increased   level  of   consumption  of   calories   attributed   to   fat   and  
added   sugar,   such   as   sodas,   sugary   drinks,   or   fast   food,   is  
directly   correlated   to   obesity   because   these   foods   are   generally  
higher   in   calories   than   in   nutrients.149      The   Surgeon   General  
stated  that  one  effective  method  for  reducing  the  risk  of  obesity  
and   its   associated   risks   is   to   limit   one’s   consumption   of   high  
calorie   and   low   nutrient   foods   while   simultaneously   adding  
vegetables,   whole   grains,   fruits,   and   lean   proteins.150      This  
proposal  for  reduction  of  obesity  rates  in  America  is  to,  “Ensure  
that  more  food  options  that  are  low  in  fat  and  calories,  as  well  as  
fruits,   vegetables,   whole   grains,   and   low-­‐‑fat   or   non-­‐‑fat   dairy  
products,  are  available”  to  every  American  consumer.151  
By   increasing   the   transparency   of   food   labels,   fewer  
 
   145.     Adult  Obesity  Facts,  CTRS.  FOR  DISEASE  CONTROL  AND  PREVENTION,  
September  9,  2014,  available  at  http://www.cdc.gov/obesity/data/adult.html.    
[hereinafter  Adult  Obesity  Facts].  
   146.     Melissa  M.  Card,  America,  You  Are  Digging  Your  Grave  with  Your  Spoon-­‐‑
Should  the  FDA  Tell  You  That  on  Food  Labels?,  68  FOOD  &  DRUG  L.J.  309,  309  (2013).  
   147.       Adult  Obesity  Facts,  supra  note  145.  
   148.     Id.  
   149.     The  Surgeon  General’s  Vision  for  a  Healthy  and  Fit  Nation,  U.S.  DEP’T.  OF  
HEALTH  AND  HUMAN  SERVS.  (2010),  
http://archive.hhs.gov/news/press/2001press/20011213.html.  
   150.     Id.  
   151.     Damon  Thompson,  U.S.  Department  of  Health  and  Human  Services,  
Overweight  and  Obesity  Threaten  U.S.  Health  Gains,  Communities  Can  Help  Address  the  
Problem,  Surgeon  General  Says,  Dec.  13,  2001  available  
at  http://archive.hhs.gov/news/press/2001pres/20011213.html.  
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consumers   would   be   deceived   into   buying   foods   that   increase  
their  health   risks   rather   than   reduce   them.     An  example  of   this  
argument   is   directly   visible   in   the   Second   Circuit’s   holding   in  
New  York  State  Rest.  Ass’n  v.  New  York  City  Bd.  of  Health.152    In  this  
case,   the   New   York   State   Restaurant   Association   (NYSRA),   a  
non-­‐‑profit  organization  compiled  of  over  7,000  restaurants  in  the  
city  limits,  challenged  the  constitutionality  of  §  81.50  of  the  New  
York  City  Health  Code,  which  required  roughly  10%  of  all  New  
York  City   restaurants,   including  major   fast   food  chains   such  as  
Kentucky  Fried  Chicken,  McDonald’s,  and  Burger  King,  to  post  
the  calorie  content  of  each  menu  item.153  
The  Second  Circuit  noted  that  §  81.50  was  originally  passed  
to:   “(1)   reduce   consumer   confusion   and   deception;   and   (2)   to  
promote   informed   consumer   decision-­‐‑making   so   as   to   reduce  
obesity   and   the   diseases   associated   with   it.”154      Section   81.50’s  
notice   of   adoption   directly   identified   seven   major   findings  
associated   with   obesity   in   New   York   City:   (1)   obesity   is   an  
epidemic;  (2)  “it  is  mainly  a  result  of  excess  calorie  consumption  
from   meals   eaten   outside   the   home;”   (3)   food   from   fast   food  
restaurants   “is   associated   with   weight   gain   and   excess   calorie  
consumption;”   (4)   the   distorted   perception   of   calorie   content  
“’led   consumers   to   unhealthy   food   choices;”   (5)   consumers  
would   make   informed   and   healthier   decisions      if   provided  
caloric  information,  similar  to  the  NLEA’s  Nutrition  Fact  panel,;  
(6)   restaurants’   voluntary   activities   were   woefully   inadequate  
and  were  unsuccessful  at   informing   the  majority  of   consumers;  
and   (7)   it   is   recommended   by   leading   health   authorities   that  
calorie   content   information   should   be   posted   at   the   point   of  
purchase.”155  
As   a   result   of   the   overwhelming   factual   support   for  
labeling,  the  Second  Circuit  held  that  although  the  Constitution  
 
   152.     See  generally  New  York  State  Rest.  Ass'ʹn  v.  New  York  City  Bd.  of  Health,  
556  F.3d  114  (2d  Cir.  2009).  
   153.     Id.  at  117.  
   154.     Id.  at  134.  
   155.     Id.  at  134-­‐‑35.  
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protects   restaurants   “when   they   engage   in   commercial   speech,  
the   First   Amendment   [was]   not   violated   [in   this   case   becuase]  
the   law   in   question   mandates   a   simple   factual   disclosure   of  
caloric  information  and  is  reasonably  related  to  New  York  City’s  
goals  of  combating  obesity.”156    In  finding  so,  the  Second  Circuit  
acknowledged  its  duty  to   increase  the  health  of  New  York  City  
residents   by   requiring   restaurants   to   post   information   about  
their  products  —  essentially  an  alternative  form  of  restricting  or  
regulating  commercial  speech.157  
Observed  in  legal  precedent  and  in  leading  health  studies,  it  
is   evident   that  Congress  has  a   substantial   interest   in   regulating  
companies’  use  of  the  term  natural,  as  required  by  prong  two  of  
the  Central   Hudson   test,   due   to   the   negative   alternative,   which  
includes   failing   to   advance   the  marketplace   of   healthy   food   or  
refusing  to  increase  the  health  of  its  citizens.  
C.  PRONG  THREE:  REGULATION  MUST  DIRECTLY  ADVANCE  
FROM  CONGRESS’S  INTEREST  
Due   to   Congress’s   compelling   interest   in   advancing   the  
marketplace   and   protecting   the   health   of   its   citizens,   Congress  
will   regulate   companies’   use   of   the   term   natural   to   advertise  
products  that  are  not  in  fact  derived  from  natural  ingredients  or  
that   are   not   processed   in   a   natural   way.      Legal   precedent  
demonstrates   that   the   burden   “is   not   satisfied   by   mere  
speculation  or  conjecture;”  rather,  to  restrain  commercial  speech,  
Congress  must  be  able  to  prove  that  damages  the  marketplace  or  
individuals  experience  are  true  and  that  restraint  on  this  speech  
will  relieve  those  harms.158  
1.  HOW  THE  REGULATION  ADVANCES  THE  MARKETPLACE  OF  
HEALTHY  FOOD  
The  Ninth  Circuit’s  holding  in  Ass’n  of  Nat’l  Advertisers,  Inc.  
 
   156.     Id.  at  118.  
   157.     Id.  at  117-­‐‑18.  
   158.     Id.  at  135.  
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v.  Lungren  illustrates  Congress’s  interest  in  protecting  a  fair  and  
competitive   marketplace   for   companies   truthfully   advertising  
their   products   as   environmentally   friendly.159      In   that   case,   the  
Ninth   Circuit   analyzed   whether   regulation   of   companies’  
commercial  speech  involving  the  use  of  common  environmental  
marketing   buzzwords   would   progress   from   its   interest   of  
advancing   the   marketplace   of   environmental   protection  
products.160  
The   court   first   weighed   its   environmental   protection  
interests  and  found  the  statute  set  reasonably  satisfied  standards  
while   simultaneously   creating   incentive   for   companies   with  
noncomplying   products   to   improve   their   environmental  
qualities  in  order  to  receive  the  benefits  of  green  labeling.161    The  
court   acknowledged   that   the   statute   advanced   California’s  
interest   in   increasing   natural   resource   preservation   while  
decreasing  the  impact  on  the  state’s  landfills.162  
The   court   also   correctly   determined   that   §   17508.5   of   the  
California   Business   and   Professions   Code   was   intended   to  
dissuade   environmentally   unfriendly   companies   from   free  
riding   off   of   environmental   advertisements   in   order   to   charge  
consumers   higher   prices   for   what   were   marketed   as   “green”  
products.163     Further,   the  court  noted   that   the  statute  attempted  
to   protect   ecologically   conscious   companies   from   unjust   price  
competition   by   ensuring   that   non-­‐‑environmental   competitors  
could   not   prevent   green   companies   from   losing   their  
marketability   by   abusing   commonly   used   environmental  
terms.164     Accordingly,   the   court  held   that  §  17508.5  adequately  
 
   159.     Ass'ʹn  of  Nat’l    Advertisers,  Inc.  v.  Lungren,  44  F.3d  726  (9th  Cir.  1994).  
   160.     Id.  at  734.  
   161.     Id.  at  733.  
   162.     Id.  at  735  (stating,  “If  producers  of  ecologically  substandard  products  
achieve  the  statute'ʹs  minimum  thresholds,  these  improvements  translate  directly  
into  less  waste  being  dumped  and  dumped  waste  decomposing  more  rapidly.”).  
   163.     Id.      
   164.     Id.  at  734-­‐‑35  (stating,  “Rivals  will  no  longer  be  able  to  negate  such  firms'ʹ  
green  marketing  edge  by  representing  as  ‘recycled’  products  consisting  of  dross  
recaptured  from  the  factory  floor  rather  than-­‐‑in  keeping  with  the  more  common  
understanding  of  the  term-­‐‑a  significant  (i.e.,  ten  percent  or  more)  portion  of  costlier  
reprocessed  post-­‐‑consumer  waste.”).  
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complied   with   the   third   prong   of   the   Central   Hudson   test   for  
purpose  of  advancing  the  marketplace.165  
While   Lungren   addressed   the   use   of   environmental  
marketing   buzzwords   on   non-­‐‑food   products,   the   case   directly  
speaks   to   the   application   of   the   term  natural   to   food  products.  
Lungren   analyzed   advertisement   terms   in   conjunction   with   an  
applicable   statute;   however,   the   court’s   holding   may   still   be  
applied   despite   the   lack   of   an   applicable   FDA   definition.  
Therefore,  it  is  evident  that  any  future  regulation  of  companies’  
commercial   speech   concerning   the   natural   label   will   advance  
directly   from  Congress’s   interest   in   advancing   the  marketplace  
of   healthy   food   by   maintaining   a   fair   and   competitive  
marketplace  for  companies  correctly  using  the  term.  
2.  HOW  THE  REGULATION  INCREASES  THE  HEALTH  OF  UNITED  
STATES  CITIZENS  
Congress’s   substantial   interest   in   regulating   the   term  
natural   is   partially   attributed   to   its   interest   in   increasing   the  
health  of   its   citizens.     Prior   case   law  has  previously   recognized  
that  “the  governmental  interest  and  the  legislative  means  chosen  
to   promote   it   ‘need   not   be   perfect,   but   simply   reasonable.’”166    
Therefore,  it  is  reasonable  that  both  the  third  prong  of  the  Central  
Hudson   test   and   the   First   Amendment   only   require   that   the  
restriction  of  the  commercial  speech  in  question  produce  “more  
than   ‘ineffective   or   remote   support’   for   a   legitimate  
governmental  policy  goal.”167  
In  Zauderer  v.  Office  of  Disciplinary  Counsel  of  Sup.  Ct.  of  Ohio,  
the  United  States  Supreme  Court  clarified  that  a  company’s  First  
Amendment  rights  are  protected  if  restrictions  on  its  commercial  
speech  are  adequately  related   to   the  state’s   interest   in   reducing  
consumer   deception   and   is   not   unjustified   or   unduly  
 
   165.     Id.  at  735.  
   166.     Lungren,  44  F.3d  at  732  (quoting  Ass’n  of  Nat.  Advertisers,  Inc.  v.  Lungren,  
809  F.  Supp.  747,  757  (N.D.  Cal.  1992)).  
   167.     Id.  (quoting  Cent.  Hudson  Gas  &  Elec.  Corp.  v.  Pub.  Serv.  Comm’n  of  New  
York,  447  U.S.  557,  564  (1980)).  
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burdensome.168      Lungren   reiterates   this   claim   by   asserting   that  
since   the   purpose   of   §   17508.5   of   the   California   Business   and  
Professions   Code   was   to   increase   the   exchange   of   information  
from  companies  to  consumers  in  the  marketplace,  meaning  that  
the   state  had  a   substantial   interest   in   regulating   environmental  
companies’   commercial   speech   due   to   its   interest   in   consumer  
protection.169      Further,   the  Ninth  Circuit   in  Lungren   recognized  
that   regulation  of   these  companies’   commercial   speech  was  not  
unjustified   or   unduly   burdensome   as   the   restriction   directly  
promoted   the   state’s   “consumer   protection”   goals,170   and   as  
green   marketing   drastically   increases   consumer   demand   for  
environmentally   friendly   products.171      Therefore,   as   the   Ninth  
Circuit   illustrates,   maintaining   consumer   protection   is   of   the  
upmost  importance.  
Based   on   the   extensive   health   reasons,   Congress   has   a  
substantial   interest   in   regulating   companies’   use   of   the   term  
natural.   Congress’s   restriction   on   this   commercial   speech   will  
advance  directly  from  this  interest,  as  doing  so  will  increase  the  
exchange  of  information  from  food  companies  to  consumers.    As  
it  is  well  determined  that  information  about  a  product  can  affect  
a   consumer’s   decision   to   purchase   that   item,   Congress’s  
substantial  interest  in  advancing  the  health  of  its  citizens  thereby  
prompts  its  ability  to  restrict  companies’  commercial  speech  that  
improperly  uses  the  term  natural  on  food  labels.  
D.  PRONG  FOUR:  REGULATION  MUST  NOT  BE  MORE  EXTENSIVE  
THAN  NECESSARY  TO  SERVE  CONGRESS’S  INTEREST  
Congress’s   imposed   regulation  will   not   be  more   extensive  
than  necessary   to  serve   the  purpose  of  protecting   its   interest   in  
 
   168.     Zauderer  v.  Office  of  Disciplinary  Counsel  of  Supreme  Court  of  Ohio,  471  
U.S.  626,  651  (1985).  
   169.     Lungren,  44  F.3d  at  733-­‐‑34  (citing  Virginia  State  Board  of  Pharmacy  v.  
Virginia  Citizens  Consumer  Council,  425  U.S.  748,  771-­‐‑72  (1976))  (stating  ,“The  First  
Amendment…does  not  prohibit  the  State  from  insuring  that  the  stream  of  
commercial  information  flow  cleanly  as  well  as  freely”).  
   170.     Id.  at  732.  (quoting  Lungren,  809  F.Supp.  at  757).  
   171.     Id.  at  733.    
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advancing   the  marketplace   for  healthy   food  and   increasing   the  
health  of   its  citizens.     Regulation  of  companies’  use  of   the   term  
natural   on   food   labels   is   not   intended   to   punish   companies  
abusing   the   term,   rather,   it   is   intended   to   provide   the  
information   consumers  need   to  make  educated  decisions  when  
purchasing  products.    It  is  also  intended  to  simultaneously  allow  
companies   correctly   using   the   term   to   enjoy   the   benefits   of  
healthy  food  labeling.  
The  United  States  Supreme  Court  previously  acknowledged  
that  the  “least  restrictive  means“  test  does  not  apply  to  questions  
based   on   restriction   of   the   First   Amendment   for   commercial  
speech.172      Instead,   the   Supreme  Court   insisted   that   there  must  
be:  
“[A]   ‘fit’  between  the  legislature’s  ends  and  the  means  
chosen   to   accomplish   those   ends,”   a   fit   that   is   not  
necessarily  perfect,   but   reasonable;   that   represents  not  
necessarily   the   single   best   disposition   but   one   whose  
scope   is   “in   proportion   to   the   interest   served,”   that  
employs  not  necessarily  the  least  restrictive  means  but  .  
.   .   a   means   narrowly   tailored   to   achieve   the   desired  
objective.173  
Essentially,   the   regulation   must   not   unduly   prohibit   a  
company  to  ensure  room  is  left  for  editing  and  commentary.174  
To   meet   this   standard   in   regards   to   the   issue   at   hand,  
Congress  must  acknowledge  that  due  to  the  incompetency  of  the  
FDA’s  current  policy  statement,  food  companies  take  advantage  
of   the   flexible  definition  of   the   term  by  applying   it   to  products  
that   do   not   necessarily   meet   the   definition   most   consumers  
imply   for   the   term   natural.      Although   Congress   “has   more  
leeway   to   regulate   potentially   misleading   commercial   speech  
 
   172.     Florida  Bar  v.  Went  For  It,  Inc.,  515  U.S.  618,  632  (1995).    The  “least  
restrictive  means”  test  questions  whether  the  least  restrictive  means  are  being  used  
to  achieve  the  desired  result.  
   173.     Id.  (quoting  Bd.  of  Trustees  of  State  Univ.  of  N.Y.  v.  Fox,  492  U.S.  469,  480  
(1989)).  
   174.     Lungren,  44  F.3d  at  736-­‐‑37.  
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than   it  does   in   the   context   of   truthful   and  non-­‐‑misleading   [sic]  
commercial  speech,  it  ‘may  not  place  an  absolute  prohibition  on  
certain   types   of   potentially   misleading   information   .   .   .   if   the  
information   also   may   be   presented   in   a   way   that   is   not  
deceptive.’”175      In  other  words,  “If   the  First  Amendment  means  
anything,   it   means   that   regulating   speech   must   be   a   last—not  
first—resort.”176  
Therefore,   to   reduce   the   confusion   of   the   term,   it   is  
Congress’s   duty,   via   the   FDA,   to   codify   the   four-­‐‑prong  Central  
Hudson   test   and   to   define   the   term  natural.      This   regulation   of  
the   restriction  of   companies’   speech   is  not  more  extensive   than  
necessary   to   serve   Congress’s   interests   of   advancing   the  
marketplace  of  healthy  food  and  increasing  the  health  of  United  
States  citizens.  
CONCLUSION  
   For   generations   families   sat   down   for   dinner   and   did   not  
need  to  question  what  went  into  their  food.177    Today,  the  fear  is  
rampant.   Food   companies   abuse   the   First   Amendment’s  
allocation   of   free   commercial   speech   by   improperly   using   the  
loosely  defined  and   regulated   term  natural   to  promote   sales   to  
consumers  attempting  to  purchase  healthy  foods.  
While   the   Lanham   Act,   primary   jurisdiction,   and  
preemption   may   hinder   a   successful   suit,   individuals   are  
permitted   to   sue   companies   misusing   the   term   natural   in   the  
advertisement  of   their  products,   so   long   as   the   court   compares  
the   use   of   the   term   to   the   current   FDA   policy   statement   and  
nothing  further.    By  limiting  any  evaluation  of  specific  use  of  the  
term   beyond   the   policy   statement,   these   courts   are   essentially  
 
   175.     Disc.  Tobacco  City  &  Lottery,  Inc.  v.  U.S.,  674  F.3d  509,  524  (6th  Cir.  2012)  
cert.  denied,  133  S.Ct.  1996  (U.S.  2013)  (quoting  In  re  R.M.J.,  455  U.S.  191,  203  (1982)).    
   176.     Thompson  v.  W.  States  Med.  Ctr.,  535  U.S.  357,  371-­‐‑73  (2002)  (describing  
the  Supreme  Court’s  application  of  the  four-­‐‑prong  Central  Hudson  test  to  a  proposed  
restriction  to  an  FDA  regulation  finding  the  level  of  commercial  speech  restriction  
more  extensive  than  necessary  to  serve  the  government’s  interest;  there  were  
numerous  non-­‐‑restrictive  solutions  that  would  satisfy  the  government).  
   177.     POLLAN,  supra  note  1,  at  411.  
16.1  SHEPARD_MACRO_FINAL.DOCX  (DO  NOT  DELETE)   10/1/15    10:28  AM  
212   MARQUETTE  ELDER’S  ADVISOR   [Vol.  16.1  
recognizing  Congress’s  ability   to   intervene  and  codify  the  four-­‐‑
prong  Central  Hudson  test  into  a  statutory  law.  
As   the   number   of   individuals   bringing   suits   continues   to  
sharply   increase,   a   number   of   companies   are   beginning   to  
voluntarily  remove  the  term  natural  from  their  labels  regardless  
of   FDA   mandate.178      In   fact,   some   companies   are   not   only  
removing   the   label   but   also   reformulating   their   products   to  
comply  with  what  consumers  envision  the  term  to  mean.179  
Congress  has   the  ability   to  codify  Central  Hudson  based  on  
the  fact  that:  (1)  prior  case  law  has  deemed  that  use  of  the  term  
natural  is  not  misleading;  (2)  Congress  has  a  substantial  interest  
in   regulating   companies’   speech   because   it   has   an   interest   in  
advancing   the  marketplace   for   natural   food   and   increasing   the  
health   of   its   citizens;   (3)   Congressional   regulation   would  
advance  directly   from   these   interests;   and   (4)   regulation  would  
not  be  more   extensive   than  necessary   to   serve   the  purpose.      In  
doing   so,   Congress   would   essentially   require   the   FDA   to  
redefine   and   regulate   use   of   the   term,   thereby   allowing  
companies   to   present   their   products   in   such   a   way   that   is  
beneficial  to  consumers.  
To   be   deceived   or   puzzled   by   companies’   natural   food  
advertisements  breaks  all  sense  of  security  we  deserve  from  the  
food   industry   and   the   government.      As   Michael   Pollan  
concluded  in  The  Omnivore’s  Dilemma,  “[W]e  eat  by  the  grace  of  
nature,   not   industry,   and  what   we’re   eating   is   never   anything  
more  or  less  than  the  body  of  the  world.”180     Therefore,  it  is  our  
fundamental   right   to   ask   Congress   to   create   and   regulate  
understandable   definitions   for   food   packaging,   for   it   is   one   of  
our  most   precious   freedoms   to   know  what   is   in   our   food   and  
ultimately  in  our  bodies.  
  
 
   178.     Esterl,  supra  note  44.  
   179.     Id.  
   180.     POLLAN,  supra  note  1,  at  411.      
